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FOREWORD
As N. A. M. Rodger says in his prize lecture in this volume, “Recent or distant, history is all we have to go on, and we cannot escape it.” Here at the Naval War College,
we know better than to try to escape history; instead, we embrace it. The study of history broadens our horizons. It exposes us to people, places, and experiences that are
otherwise inaccessible, and in doing so it builds our strategic and cultural perspective. I use that last phrase deliberately, because it forms the heart of the mission
statement of the Naval War College. The College educates and develops future leaders through the process of broadening their perspectives. It fosters a commitment
to lifelong learning and prepares them to lead in the Cognitive Age. Thus, history
forms an integral part of the College’s purpose. We promote its study, engage with
its lessons, and expose our students to the benefits of its unique perspectives.
The publication of the first four Hattendorf Prize lectures demonstrates the essential value of historical scholarship to the College’s mission. The Hattendorf Prize
is the most prestigious award that any scholar can receive in the fields of maritime
or naval history, and it serves as a beacon to encourage new scholarship in these
important fields. An indication of the importance of the award is that it has been
awarded once by the Secretary of the Navy at graduation and twice by the Chief of
Naval Operations in person at the College’s flagship international event, the biennial International Seapower Symposium (ISS). The world’s leading naval gathering,
ISS brings together chiefs of navies and coast guards from around the globe to discuss common challenges and identify opportunities for cooperation. The prize recipients are leading members of the international academic community, and their
presence at ISS has reinforced the College’s commitment to international cooperation, as well as the College’s mission of educating naval leaders about history and
strategy.

x
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The award’s namesake, Professor Emeritus John B. Hattendorf, embodies its
values. During his many years of service as the College’s Ernest J. King Professor
of Maritime History, John conducted the kind of archival research that shapes our
current understanding of the purpose and mission of the College. His career has
served as a model for the prize criteria: to serve the Navy by improving the quality
and range of scholarship in maritime history; to engage globally, with an appreciation for scholarship in different languages and from different national, cultural, and
regional perspectives; and to see maritime history as a broad field in global history, one that builds on insights that cut across traditional academic and national
boundaries.
John is the lead author of the wonderfully readable centennial history of the
College, Sailors and Scholars. In reading it before my arrival in Newport this summer, I was struck by his description of the College’s earliest days. At the College’s
formal opening ceremony on September 4, 1885, Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, the
founder and first President, told his audience that the College had no money for
books, furniture, heat, or light. It was housed in the former Newport poorhouse,
which offered little more than shelter from the winds off Narragansett Bay. Yet Luce
was confident that his project was worthwhile and that support for it would follow.
Well over a century later, we can only marvel at how far the College has come.
Where Luce once worried about the very survival of the institution, we now play
host to the world’s leading scholars, alongside chiefs of navies. We also recently
hosted the Navy’s new Chief Learning Officer, highlighting the importance of the
College for the future of naval education. The Department of the Navy’s recent
Education for Seapower (E4S) report argues that the education of our force is vital
for national security. Reflecting this renewed emphasis on education, the College
is investing in its own future by renovating Sims Hall and making other capital
improvements.
The Hattendorf Prize demonstrates the viability of Luce’s vision and exemplifies the role that scholarship can play in supporting the mission of the U.S. Navy
and its partners. For Luce, the College was to be “a place of original research on all
questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war.” We begin every academic year at the College with these words, they
feature prominently on the College’s website, and we frequently refer to them in
College publications. But as with any motto, the more the words are repeated, the
easier it is to forget their meaning. The publication of these prize lectures should
cause us to consider these words anew. The distinguished scholars honored here
embody Luce’s call. They have conducted original research of the highest quality
in naval history and its role in contemporary debates, and by bringing them to the
College the Hattendorf Prize has fortified the College’s purpose as the U.S. Navy’s
essential connection between the sea services and academics. These stimulating
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lectures remind us of the educational mission of the College and exemplify the
value of connecting scholars and practitioners. It is my great personal pleasure to
commend these lectures to you.

Shoshana S. Chatfield
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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The Hattendorf Prize Lectures,
Volume 1

INTRODUCTION
The publication of the first four John B. Hattendorf Prize Lectures presents an
opportunity to revisit the original criteria for the award. Developed with the
support of Rear Admiral Roger Nolan and the Naval War College Foundation in
2011, the prize is accompanied by ten thousand dollars and a medal cast in bronze.
It is awarded for distinguished academic achievement that contributes to a deeper understanding of the uses of sea services in history. From the outset, it was
intended to be international, so as to encourage a global perspective on maritime
affairs. It can be given either for a single work or for a sustained body of scholarly
achievement over many years.
It is noteworthy how the selection committees have interpreted these last two
criteria. Not only are the four scholars honored so far not American citizens,
but they also write about topics other than the history of the U.S. Navy. All four
earned the prize on the basis of many decades of scholarship rather than a single
work. In both respects, these honorees reflect the scholarship and values of the
award’s namesake, John B. Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus at the
Naval War College. As John’s students and colleagues know, he constantly seeks an
international perspective by engaging with scholars around the world and working
in many languages. He has written and edited dozens of books and many more
articles and chapters on a range of subjects—all of which make him worthy of his
own lifetime achievement award.
All four of the honorees whose lectures are included in this collection are from
the same generation as the prize’s namesake: all were born in the decade beginning
in 1939 (Werner Rahn in 1939, John Hattendorf 1941, Geoffrey Till and Paul Kennedy 1945, N. A. M. Rodger 1949) and came of scholarly age in the 1970s. This
collection presents an opportunity to reflect on the influences and achievements
of that generation.
Paul Kennedy’s lecture, in particular, marks a return to his roots. By ranging
widely over three great world wars and emphasizing the structural factors that

4

THE HATTENDORF PRIZE LECTURES, VOLUME 1

shaped naval affairs, especially geography and economics, his lecture recalls the
publication in 1976 of the work that first made his name, The Rise and Fall of British
Naval Mastery. It is difficult to overstate the influence of this book on the field of
naval history. Nicholas A. M. Rodger, in an otherwise acerbic annotated bibliog1
raphy, called it a “classic history.” Indeed, British Naval Mastery was in many ways
responsible for reestablishing the field of naval history within academia. In the decades before its publication, the titans of the first half of the twentieth century—Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and others—had been succeeded by a generation of historians shaped by the Second World War: Robert G. Albion, Samuel
Eliot Morison, Stephen Roskill, Arthur Marder, and others. After 1945, those in the
latter group published extensively on the conduct of the war at sea, authoring the
official histories, engaging in fierce debates, and shaping public perception of the
war. Yet by the early 1970s, naval history had come to be seen as a backwater of
purely operational histories, chronicling one battle after another. Although this
perception was slightly unfair, Kennedy’s British Naval Mastery demonstrated that
naval history could be much more.
In his prize lecture, Kennedy’s characteristic approach comes through in the
opening paragraphs. Despite being the recipient of an award in maritime history,
he explicitly seeks to explain the limitations of sea power. He spends most of his
energy on the periods between the three great wars of 1793–1815, 1914–18, and
1939–45, and suggests that the subtitle of his piece should be Sea Power in an Age
of Change. What motivates his analysis is not the tactics used at Trafalgar or Jutland but the Industrial Revolution that occurred in between. How, he asks, did sea
power play a pivotal role in the first and third wars, but not (he suggests) in the
second? His answer weaves together multiple strands: technological changes that
influenced operational capabilities, the geopolitics of the coalitions in each war,
and the acceleration of relative economic changes in wartime. Naval history therefore is only partially about ships at sea, and has at least as much to do with finance
as with gunnery tactics.
Werner Rahn also looks beyond the traditional topics of naval history in examining the ebbs and flows of German naval affairs over a century and a half. In
building a great battle fleet on the eve of the First World War, German planners
ignored the geographical constraints of Germany’s location in the North Sea. When
war came and the High Seas Fleet was contained, the only apparent alternative was
submarine warfare; but this raised more questions than it answered. Chancellor
Bethmann-Hollweg worried that a reliance on U-boats “would claim as a stake our
existence as a great power and the future of our nation in its entirety.” This is not
the language of the navalists. Rahn highlights the limitations of sea power much
as Kennedy does. By risking American entry into the war—both times—German
naval strategists played directly into the underlying relative economic strengths of
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their enemies. In both Rahn’s and Kennedy’s lectures, we can hear the echoes of
Kennedy’s best seller, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), and we can see
its origins in naval history. To reiterate: sea power depends on economic power.
Both Kennedy and Rahn demonstrate how historians can speak to navies. Kennedy does so by encouraging naval officers to think beyond the narrow confines
of their professional lives and understand how sea power should be integrated into
larger national strategies. Before launching into his survey, Rahn emphasizes that
the public and naval personnel are interested in the past, and it is essential that
historians inform them about it without sacrificing complexity.
If Rahn and Kennedy show historians how to speak to navies and show navies
the value of history, Nicholas Rodger and Geoffrey Till are much more blunt: they
tell. Their essays bookend the volume, but they work best as a pair. Rather than examining particular historical phenomena, they take a more philosophical approach.
“[H]istory is all we have to go on,” argues Rodger, and therefore it must play a
central role in shaping naval policy. At the same time, navies need to beware the
pitfalls of historical myths. Memories are what make us human, and history is our
collective memory; but, much like our memories, history is fallible, and much of
what we think we know is wrong. The role of the historian is to correct the record.
When given opportunities to speak to those whose primary concern is what will
happen in the future, historians should proceed cautiously. History never repeats
itself exactly, and “lessons” from history are, at best, general warnings. Historians
are no better than naval officers at predicting the future, but they can encourage naval officers to think more carefully about the past so as to have a better foundation
for thinking about the future. Rodger and Rahn both make the point that historians
cannot neglect the complexity of their subject, as the fastest way to create a dangerous myth is to oversimplify the past.
Till echoes two of Rodger’s points. First, navies need to know their histories:
“a navy that does not know its history has no soul.” Like Rodger and Rahn, Till
worries that history too often is used as a means of socializing new entrants, telling
myths that shape organizational identities but that are in fact oversimplifications
or simply wrong. He also agrees with Rodger that history rhymes. Navies should
study their history not because past events will recur exactly, but rather because
practitioners need to be able to draw on a wide pool of “comparable but not identical situations.” Till also extends Rodger’s arguments in two ways. History is not
simply the gathering of comparable situations; it is an intellectual process. Professional military education should force students to think from the cabinet meeting
to the battlefield and back again, and from military hardware back to the factory
and raw materials. Historians seek to explain past phenomena, and they necessarily
must think flexibly and creatively about causal chains. Training leaders to think like
historians makes it more likely that the right questions will be asked. The burden,
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according to Till, should not fall entirely on practitioners, and his lecture ends with
a call to standards for naval historians.
Recently the Naval War College established the John B. Hattendorf Center for
Maritime Historical Research to address precisely these issues. It advocates for the
teaching of history in professional military education, and it serves as a central
resource for scholars of U.S. naval history and maritime history more broadly. Its
faculty contribute to the curriculum and publish original documentary research. In
the spirit of the Hattendorf Prize, the center seeks a global perspective on maritime
affairs, and it connects navies and naval historians.
These four lectures represent the best work of a generation of naval historians,
and they illustrate the ways in which that generation crafted its work. Every discipline has its own founders, and those founders serve as reference points; they rarely require introductions or explanations (Clausewitz, Marx, Weber, Keynes, etc.).
They become integrated into the language of the discipline, serving as shorthand for
complex ideas and extensive bodies of scholarship. The language of naval history,
as exemplified in this volume, uses the scholars of the turn of the twentieth century,
especially Mahan and Corbett, to sketch the outlines of arguments and highlight
areas of disagreement. For Kennedy, the First World War was a “Mackinder-ite
land struggle, with surface navies operating at the margins.” Victory for the Allies
was, to a small degree, a product of keeping open the sea lines of communication
(Corbett) and, to a much larger degree, a product of winning on land (Mackinder)
and introducing American industrial might (Kennedy). Rahn disagrees, arguing
that Germany’s large battle-fleet-in-being helped pin down British resources and
partly justified the arch-Mahanian approach of Tirpitz. (Rahn concedes that the
fleet cost too much to be worth the trouble.) Britain’s distant economic blockade
and Corbettian control of the sea lines of communication was not marginal but
central to Germany’s defeat.
So long as historians do not allow shorthand versions of Mahan and Corbett to
confuse their readers or oversimplify their arguments, we should embrace them
as reference points. The debates these theorists sparked are timeless, and they are
helpful in integrating contemporary scholarship into an existing framework. Yet
Rodger and Till both warn of the limitations of Mahan and Corbett. For Till, the
problem is the fundamental flexibility of sea power. As navies are asked to do ever
more, especially low-intensity enforcement of international law, Mahan and Corbett do not seem to be able to offer much guidance. They should be read for perspectives on war fighting and deterrent war prevention at sea, but not as substitutes
for a meaningful discussion of the wide range of obligations navies now must meet.
Rodger calls attention to Mahan’s assumption that the world will continue as it
has before. Like Thomas Malthus a century earlier, Mahan had the misfortune to
publish on the cusp of epochal changes in his subject area. While this in no way
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invalidates his work, it serves as a cautionary tale to historians eager to extract lessons from their research.
What Rodger and Till suggest, then, is that we need a more complex understanding of Mahan and Corbett. This is not a new idea. As John Hattendorf himself
argued, “We need to return once again to these writers, considering their thought
carefully in the light of continuing historical research and understanding.” He
went on to praise the Naval Institute’s Classics of Sea Power series for providing
modern commentary and annotations on the great works, and to encourage both
2
practitioners and historians to consider their relevance. That was 1993; today,
the Naval Institute is publishing its 21st Century Foundations series with similar
3
goals. We must continue in this vein, but we also should understand the difference
between a foundational reference point and scripture. Mahan, Corbett, and their
peers are useful only insofar as we ask the right questions of them. In some cases,
they may not be fit for the purpose, even if they seem destined to remain the stars
by which naval history navigates.
Let this volume serve three purposes. First, it is an example of naval history
done well. All the essays were written by distinguished scholars, and they demonstrate the best of the field. They look beyond operations, integrating sea power
into larger frameworks; they revel in complexity, rejecting simple explanations; and
most of all, they ask the right questions. The lectures also demonstrate the enduring relevance of sea power theory. Mahan is not enough, but—thanks in part to the
prize laureates—no one is suggesting that he is. Understanding the parameters of
the historical debates, as well as their limitations, is essential for all those interested
in naval history.
Finally, the lectures connect naval historians to navies. It is remarkable how
easy it is for the two groups to ignore each other. Navies are comfortable with their
myths, and generally do not like to be told that most of what they think they know
is wrong. Then, too, historians generally are uncomfortable when asked to apply
their work. Better, some say, to keep the sacred flame of pure scholarly inquiry
safe from the grubby hands of practitioners. Yet, as the prize lectures remind us,
naval historians need to spend time with naval personnel so as to understand their
culture and worldview. As the Hattendorf Prize and the Hattendorf Center at the
Naval War College look toward the next decade of operations, these are valuable
lessons to keep in mind.
EVAN WILSON
Assistant Professor, John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
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N O T E S 1 Rodger did not spare his own work, calling his earliest book “sketchy and unreliable.” N. A. M. Rodger,
The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of
Britain, 1649–1815 (London: Penguin, 2004), pp.
821, 845.
2 John B. Hattendorf, “Mahan Is Not Enough: Conference Themes and Issues,” in Mahan Is Not Enough:
The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir

Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond,
ed. James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf, Historical Monograph 10 (Newport, RI: Naval War College
Press, 1993), p. 9.
3 While new books on more-obscure thinkers are
being added regularly, it is unsurprising to note that
21st Century Mahan and 21st Century Corbett were
among the first to be published.

The President, U.S. Naval War College, takes great pleasure
in awarding

The Hattendorf Prize for
Distinguished Original Research
in Maritime History
to N. A. M. Rodger, M.A., D.Phil., F.B.A., F.R.Hist.S., F.S.A.,
Research Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
The Naval War College is pleased to recognize you as the first Hattendorf Prize Laureate. This
award is predicated on your distinguished achievements as an assiduous historical researcher
as well as the author of beautifully written and intellectually impressive studies of Britain’s naval
history. Your scope, embracing more than a thousand years of naval history, is informed and
given depth by an equally broad understanding of your subject. Your impressive command of
sources, ranging from medieval documents in Latin to modern archives and scholarly works in
a broad range of European languages, has established a new and more comprehensive approach
to writing a national naval history. You have written that “the naval historian has to be aware
of what other historians are writing to do justice to his own subject, and explain its importance
to others. To do so he has to integrate a wide range of knowledge. It goes without saying that
this demands a great deal of reading and not inconsiderable literary skills, so it is not surprising
that successful naval histories which take this approach are rare.” Your works exemplify that
description and have themselves become prizes for us to read. This award honors you and your
work, expressing appreciation for your distinguished academic research, insight, and writing
that contribute to a deeper historical understanding of the broad context and interrelationships
involved in the roles, achievements, and uses of navies within the contexts of both maritime
and general history.
Presented this 20th day of October 2011 at the
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
John N. Christenson
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
President, Naval War College

I
The Perils of History
N. A. M. RODGER

A

ccording to Hegel, we learn from history that we do not learn from his1
tory. We also learn that historians are deeply unreliable, and never more
so than when they are foolish enough to predict the future. Historians, in
fact, would certainly be the worst possible guides to the policy maker, were it not
for the alternative. But the alternative is not other people with better information
but other people with no information, for it is the past that makes the present and
the future. All of us, as individuals, as organizations, and as societies, have personalities that are made up of our experiences. It is memory that makes us what we are,
and to lose memory is to lose personality. In this age of dementia, many of us are
painfully familiar with what happens when people lose their memories, but though
individuals can lose their minds, societies and organizations (like navies) never
escape their past. All we know comes from our experience, and all our experience
is of the past. The future, which it would be very convenient to know, is regrettably
inaccessible; the present constantly slips between our fingers. Only the past makes
us who we are, and it shapes our understanding of the world. The question is not
whether we should or whether we can learn from the past; we have no choice, if we
are to learn at all. Recent or distant, history is all we have to go on, and we cannot
escape it.
To read the writings or listen to the speeches of public figures is to encounter
a dense tissue of historical references and allusions. Sometimes they are conscious
references to historical events that form, or are believed to form, part of the common stock of social memory. Occasionally they are the fruit of serious knowledge
of the past, but more often they refer to some of the common myths that bind nations and societies together. Usually these myths have historical roots, but in the
process of shaping national identity they tend to lose any close relation with the
truth of what really happened. Where do they come from, these urban myths and
long-exploded fallacies that form so much of the discourse of public life? Halfremembered primary-school lessons, anecdotes overheard in the pub, newspapers
read over someone’s shoulder seem to have more power to form opinion than any
scholar could dream of. “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt
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from any intellectual influence,” wrote J. M. Keynes, “are usually the slaves of some
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”2 Our problem is
not that we know too little history to understand the present but that we know too
much, and most of it is wrong.
Even when it is right, moreover, the history that is put to use is often the wrong
history. In September 2011 a short article appeared in the Economist that reviewed
the situation of the euro, quoting an unnamed ambassador:3 “I feel like a filing clerk
in Berlin in 1945. The work of government goes on, even as the war approaches.”
Inspired by this remark, the anonymous author indulged in an extended range of
military metaphors and allusions to events of the Second World War. Clearly he
wanted to show off his knowledge of that war, but it was not obvious that it told the
reader anything at all about the financial crisis. There is of course a very relevant
history that could and should have been deployed—the history of currency unions.
The history of the Zollverein (which led to the unified currency of the 1871 German Reich); of the Latin, Scandinavian, and East African currency unions (which
all failed); of the West African franc and the Belgium-Luxembourg currency link
(still flourishing)—all offer relevant lessons. The eighteenth-century New England
monetary union shows that common currencies can circulate without political
union, while the history of the United States over its first century shows that a
political union does not require a common currency (at least initially). All these
would have been highly instructive historical excursions; the Second World War
was mere self-indulgence, and even if the journalist had been a real expert in it, it
would still have been irrelevant.
What is more, real expertise is no guarantee that history will guide us in the
right direction. There could be no better nor more apposite example of the expert
historian than Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, and yet in reading his great works we can
easily see that he was wrong to assume that certain features of the world he had
grown up with would last forever. For him the sea was always commanded by a
single, dominant European naval power, and Britain was the only plausible candidate. He looked forward to the day when the U.S. Navy would be capable of joining
an alliance with Britain, but he clearly did not expect that there would ever be more
than a handful of serious naval powers. Though he lived in the first great age of free
trade and liberal economics, he did not foresee that the result would be the creation
of many advanced economies and modern navies all over the world. Nor did he
realize that the growth of the U.S. Navy, to which he dedicated his career, would
inevitably make it impossible for Britain or any other European power to dominate
the seas of the world single-handed. Consequently he has relatively little to say to
our age of naval coalitions.

THE PERILS OF HISTORY

Most common and most destructive of all, however, are not appeals to the lessons of real history, nor even conscious references to shared myth, but unconscious
assumptions that reveal themselves in turns of phrase and habits of thought. This is
history at the deepest and most universal level, the history that lies below the foundations of every intellectual construction and undermines so many of them. This
is the history that everybody shares and nobody needs to think about; these are the
assumptions that are never challenged. This history is everywhere, but much of it
is bad history, and the longer it goes unchallenged, the more dangerous it becomes.
This history provides people with ready-made solutions to new problems, and it
“proves” that they are the right solutions.
Whatever the locus of action, from national government down to precinct, whether in an
executive body or a legislative committee, some participants are almost sure to start with
favorite, long-developed schemes. Their inclination will be to ignore whatever seems not to
fit and to define the problem as one calling for solutions they have handy. Their arguments
will be supported, more than likely, by analogies.4

The analogies will be drawn from experience, that is, from history, and most likely
from the history that has the most emotional power.
Traumatic events dig deep foundations in the national psyche. In Britain the
appeasement of Hitler has long been such an event. Sir Anthony Eden’s response
to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 was clearly shaped by his
determination never again to appease a dictator. But events suggest that the precedent of Hitler was not very helpful in dealing with Colonel Nasser, and one cannot
help thinking that if Eden had confronted and analyzed it he would have realized
as much. In other crises since, the reflex never to appease a dictator has evidently served British governments rather better. For the United States the equivalent
trauma is Pearl Harbor. It was the image that leaped to many minds on that “day
of infamy,” September 11, 2001, when the terrorists attacked the Twin Towers, and
it evidently shaped President Bush’s response, which was to declare war on somebody at once and invade somewhere as quickly as possible. Even at the time, many
observers doubted if it was wise to raise a criminal gang to the status of a sovereign
state or whether invasion of one or two countries, however unpleasant they were,
was really the best response to an international terrorist movement.5
Today, Pearl Harbor visibly lurks just below the surface of much discussion of
U.S. relations with China. Clearly there are excellent reasons for the United States
(and the world) to pay close attention to China, but to me it seems that the case
differs in most respects from that of Japan in the 1930s and that the mere fact that
China constitutes a potential threat to U.S. interests from approximately the same
part of the world is a bad reason for drawing conscious—or, more dangerously,
unconscious—parallels with 1941. It is especially dangerous because of one notable
difference: in 1941 the Pacific naval powers were (as a consequence of the Washington naval treaties) so far apart that they were largely out of each other’s range, but
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today the United States and China have many opportunities to clash in and around
the China seas. A sudden emergency generated by some unexpected incident is the
worst possible moment to be guided by unconscious historical parallels. Moreover,
the Chinese too have their traumatic moments in history that are likely to shape
their responses in any confrontation with an external power. In their case, it is the
myth-history of the Opium War that is endlessly invoked to explain how to resist
foreign aggression.6 This history would be well worth study by American policy
makers.
Since history is impossible to escape and bad history is difficult to avoid, the
historian has at least the essential function of distinguishing the two, of warning
against bad history and false analogy. Historians may have no special qualifications
to predict the future, but at least they can check the misuse of the past. For strategists and policy makers, however, this may not be enough. I know from experience
that people can be very annoyed with historians who insist how much better qualified they are than anyone else to avoid the dangers of predicting the future by false
analogy with the past but then refuse to risk their reputations by making any predictions at all. The historian must always be intensely conscious that history never
repeats itself exactly; historical parallels are never really parallel, and the “lessons of
history” are at best general warnings, not specific instructions. It has been well said
that “history never repeats itself, but sometimes it rhymes.”7 Historians cannot help
noticing resemblances between the present day and the periods they study, and
these may at least suggest pitfalls to avoid and possibilities to exploit.
I myself have recently been studying the nineteenth century, and I believe there
are suggestive similarities between that era and our own in two dimensions: diplomacy and strategy, and economics and trade. In diplomacy and strategy we may
concentrate on the leading European nations, for in the nineteenth century the
great powers were still essentially European. The United States, as the century wore
on, increasingly acquired the economic potential to act as a great power, but in
practice it remained largely absorbed in its own internal development; it did not
choose to involve itself deeply in world affairs, and (except during the Civil War)
its armed forces were negligible. For almost forty years after the Congress of Vienna
ended the Napoleonic War, the peace of Europe was largely assured by the “Concert
of Europe”—meaning the loose, informal grouping of the victors in that war—to
preserve stability and restrain French expansionism. This was then disrupted by
the Russian war of 1852–55 (rather misleadingly called the Crimean War, since its
origins lay in the Levant and its most decisive campaign was fought in the Baltic),
followed by the German and Italian wars of unification.
In 1871 the creation of the German Second Reich marked the emergence of a
new, powerful, and expansionist military power in Central Europe. For the last
thirty years of the century and the early years of the next, Europe (and by extension
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the world as well) was increasingly destabilized by the rise of two hungry and ambitious powers, Germany and Russia, and by the decline and vulnerability of two
extensive empires, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Comfortable, possessor powers like Britain and France had imperial ambitions and rivalries across
the world but hoped to keep the peace within Europe by restraining aggressors and
supporting existing frontiers. The British in particular feared that a collapse of the
Ottoman Empire would allow Russia to expand to the Mediterranean and threaten
the vital imperial sea route to India. Toward the end of the century the British became increasingly worried that Russian expansion in Central Asia would place the
Russian army within direct striking distance of India—though the modern eye and
modern maps suggest that the very long distances and very high mountains that
separated them would have put an invasion far out of practical reach.
Retrospect suggests that Britain’s preeminence was under growing threat from
the 1870s at latest. British statesmen, however, like the vast majority of world leaders in every age, had learned their view of the world as young men and did not substantially change it as they grew older. The leaders of that generation had formed
their outlook in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, when it seemed that Britain had nothing to fear from Continental rivals and nothing to lose from what Lord Palmerston
(twice prime minister) called “splendid isolation.” For them British preeminence
was a given, a product of history and economic dominance that no one could doubt
or challenge. There was no need to spend much money on the navy, still less the
army, because only savages would be ignorant and foolish enough to challenge
them. The only superpower dominated the world by political and economic rather
than military strength. It has been well said that “superpowers in any age function
much on strategic credit. Their writ, that is, runs much more on the basis of their
reputation for effective coercion than on the actual exercise of power.”8 Reputation
was cheap and effective, there had been no credible military threat to Britain for
half a century, and British political leaders of the generation of Disraeli and Gladstone found it difficult to take seriously the idea that there might be another in the
foreseeable future.
This confidence rested on Britain’s economic superiority. By 1815 Britain was
the world’s leading trading nation, with an unsurpassed financial strength that had
allowed it to finance the entire allied war effort in the closing stages of the Napoleonic War. In the succeeding years of peace the Industrial Revolution gathered pace,
and in the 1840s the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts threw open
British shipping and overseas trade to international competition and ushered in the
era of free trade. This was the first age of globalization, when the free movement of
capital and technology and the progressive removal of barriers to trade led to a very
rapid increase in international prosperity. It also led to the rise of new industrial
powers abroad. From being in the 1840s the only advanced industrial economy in
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the world, Britain was by the end of the century only one of several, some of them
having much greater populations, land areas, and stores of natural resources than
its own.
It was obvious to contemporaries that British economic preeminence was under threat, and it seemed to many that ambitious rivals might easily translate that
threat into military terms—or rather, naval terms, for all credible strategic threats
to Britain were necessarily naval ones. By the 1880s the old-fashioned and quite unrealistic fears of an unexpected surprise attack across the Channel had been largely
abandoned. In their place came a newer and more credible threat to Britain’s worldwide trade, to an economy now heavily dependent on imported food and raw materials and exported manufactures. Moreover, this threat no longer came entirely
from rival European powers. Advanced economies were rising in other parts of the
world, some of them showing signs of spending their wealth and industrial capacity on modern navies. For two centuries the British had been able to dominate the
seas of the world indirectly by keeping their main fleet at home, for defense against
their neighbors, who were their only serious enemies. By the late 1890s two small
but modern navies, those of the United States and Japan, were rising in distant seas
that could not be dominated from Europe.
British strategists recognized their country’s radical and unique dependence on
seaborne trade but were divided in their response. Some feared attack and planned
various strategies of defense. Others placed more or most of their trust in the development of international law. The rise of the global economy was paralleled in the
second half of the nineteenth century by the rise of a new kind of international law,
founded on international treaties signed by most, if not all, of the leading powers.
The first of these was the Declaration of Paris of 1857, which professed to outlaw
privateering (though the United States refused to sign and still claims the right to
issue letters of marque). More important were the Hague and London Conferences
of 1908–1909, which set out to write international rules to protect wartime trade,
define contraband, and forbid blockade. The Declaration of London proposed to
establish an International Prize Court that would have been the first international
court with jurisdiction over sovereign states (though only if both parties chose to
appeal to it).
The proposed Prize Court never came to fruition, and the force of these international agreements, like all their predecessors, rested on “customary international
law,” which essentially meant the capacity of neutrals to restrain belligerent navies.
Behind this expectation that neutral powers would have real influence over belligerents lay a clear understanding of the complexity and vulnerability of the web of
international trade, on which all advanced economies were heavily, and mutually,
dependent. Any form of economic warfare at sea, it was presumed, would ruin all
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the participants and render war impossible to sustain. In the era of globalization,
therefore, modern war would have to be short if it were to be possible at all, and
the capacity to keep it going would depend largely or entirely on neutrals’ freedom
to trade. The First World War was to falsify almost all of these expectations, in the
process ruining the leading belligerents and wrecking the world trading system.
In place of free trade it brought an age of protectionism, financial crisis, economic
collapse, and another world war.
What, if any, resemblances may we find between this world and our own? First,
we must obviously increase the scale from Europe to the whole world. That done,
we may see some suggestive parallels between the postwar settlements of 1815 and
of 1945. The Cold War was scarcely a “Concert of Europe,” but in both cases the
wartime allies continued to dominate the postwar world and prevent their rivalries
from leading to war, except among client states on the strategic periphery. Once
again a new age of free trade and surging economic growth lifted nations in some
parts of the world from poverty into the status of advanced economies in two generations. Once again this huge advance in world prosperity depended entirely on
ships trading across free and open seas. Once again it is very widely assumed that
the complexity and interdependence of the modern world trading system makes it
unthinkable that any advanced state would contemplate disrupting it by war. Today,
however, the new age of free trade seems to be threatened by financial collapse and
political instability in ways reminiscent of the 1890s. Ambitious rising powers once
more press against the weaknesses of existing empires.
A comparison of Japan then and China now suggests itself—but I have already
suggested that I think this is simplistic and dangerous. I think there may be more
to be learned by comparing modern China9 with Bismarckian Germany. Both are
populous states in central positions with historic pretensions to imperial status,
and with rapidly growing economic and military strength to back them. In both
cases dazzling economic growth tends to conceal the extent to which the economies remain backward and dependent on foreign technology and finance. In both
cases political unity and constitutional structures remain fragile, and foreign policy
is marked by aggressive insecurity. Growing prosperity and power will no doubt
continue to reconcile many tensions, but the Chinese regime would be vulnerable
to any serious economic or political check. This is an uncomfortable reflection, for
this is the classic situation in which unstable dictatorships attempt to rebuild crumbling support at home by reckless adventures abroad. The world has a heavy investment in China’s economic growth and political unity. A China growing smoothly
to become a prosperous and advanced economy with a large stake in world security
and peace and a huge market open to trade would be very much in the interest of
all. A nuclear-armed China sliding backward into poverty and instability presents
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incalculable risks. A large sector of public opinion in the United States regards China’s strength as a threat, but it is China’s weakness that ought to worry us.
So ought the fragility of the world economic system. Piracy and protectionism,
to name only the two most obvious dangers, are capable of inflicting grave damage
on world prosperity. The Somalis have shown how easy and profitable is piracy for
ransom, in the tradition of the North African regencies, and there is plenty of scope
for others to imitate them. Protectionism in the wake of a world financial crisis did
much to bring on the Second World War, and there are populist politicians, in the
United States and elsewhere, willing to try again. A regional war, in, say, the Middle
East, could have destructive effects on essential international trades, notably in oil.
In these and other aspects the machinery of international free trade is delicate and
easily deranged. Precedent suggests that international law, naval power, and the enlightened self-interest of trading nations are relatively feeble defenses. I do not want
to predict that another major war is coming soon, but it is certainly not impossible,
and if there is any truth in my comparison with the late nineteenth century, the
analogy is not encouraging. Navies have unequaled flexibility as instruments of
deterrence and diplomacy, and in the present state of the world it seems to me that
their most urgent task is to win the peace.
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W

hile many great and extended conflicts involving the use of the sea
have been fought over the past two thousand years, the three most
notable in modern times were undoubtedly those struggles for global
mastery in the years 1793–1815, 1914–18, and 1939–45. Each of these conflicts
has produced a plethora of detailed works upon aspects of the war in question, but
the profession has avoided making a comparative study of them to draw broader
conclusions about the influence of sea power in the modern world.1
This chapter makes an attempt to do that, and with a particular interest in examining why the exercise of naval force during the second of the three conflicts
is generally regarded as having had much less effectiveness than in the other two.
Examining why naval power in 1914–18 had much less “influence” than its prewar
advocates hoped might then help us to a better understanding of the limitations of
naval force as well as of its positive capabilities. Above all, the essay is interested in
the changing contexts in which sea power had to operate over these one hundred
and fifty years of what one scholar nicely termed “the influence of history upon sea
power.”2
This is a lengthy argument, and so the structure of the essay below has been
divided, rather obviously, into wartime and peacetime sections. Since the great
naval struggle for mastery between 1793 and 1815 is generally regarded as the
apotheosis of sea power in action, no detailed account is offered below of the many
great battles that took place within those years, or of where British diplomacy
and naval influence successfully marched hand in hand, as in the Baltic, or of the
campaigns in the Eastern Seas.3 What seemed more important was to produce
a reasonably brief structural analysis of why it was that sea power played such a
prominent role in a struggle for the mastery of Europe that in the final analysis
obviously had to be settled by military victory over Napoleon on land. Not all
European great wars saw naval power play a significant part; indeed, the greatest in recent memory—the Thirty Years’ War between 1618 and 1648—had little
to do with the sea, or the sea with it. Why it was different in the titanic French
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Revolutionary and Napolonic Wars therefore obviously requires explanation before
the rest of this essay can unfold.
From time to time this text engages with the arguments and presumptions of
Captain Mahan regarding how sea power exactly did influence the wars in question. This is not done in any intellectually hostile way; it simply seeks to offer a reality check upon whether it was sea power itself that caused the outcomes claimed,
and if completely or to a lesser degree. It also attempts to test the story of these
wars against the strategic theories of the two greatest of Mahan’s “foils”: Sir Julian
Corbett, with his claim that it was command of control of the ocean routes (not
the decisive battle) that counted; and Sir Halford Mackinder, with his claim that it
was land power, or who gained control of the great West European landmass, that
would count most in the outcome of modern wars.4
To undertake a comparative analysis of the influence of sea power upon certain earlier wars—say, between the War of the Spanish Succession, the Seven Years’
War, and the American Revolutionary War—is not so difficult, simply because
so very much about navies and warships stayed the same, and because the battles
largely took place within the very similar constraints of time and tide, during the
high point of the age of fighting sail. This was no longer the case after the early
nineteenth century, because of two enormous, and separate, changes in historical conditions. While the 1793–1815 campaigns took place in the pre–Industrial
Revolution era, the circumstances under which the admirals of 1914 had to fight
were dramatically different. Further and very large changes in the condition and
circumstance of navies were also to occur in the much briefer period between the
second and third of the great global wars analyzed here. The British Navy of, say,
1940 may have seemed very similar to that of a quarter-century earlier, yet so much
had changed, especially in regard to the rise of air power, both carrier-based and
land-based. Further, the global naval balances, especially in the Far East, were now
quite altered from those of 1914. Captain Mahan, in summarizing the “elements of
sea power” in his first, great work, felt that they belonged to the “unchanging order
of things, remaining the same, in cause and effect, from age to age.”5 It is the intention of this essay to test if that was really so, given the stupendous impact of the
Industrial Revolution upon warfare, and the special influence of air power upon
fighting in the years after 1919.
It follows that a very large part of this chapter has had to focus on the two periods between the wars. While not originally foreseen by the author, it became increasingly clear that no analysis of the influence of sea power upon history could
be made unless maritime affairs were tested against change over time, between the
great conflicts, especially change driven by the onset of newer technologies. It is not
unreasonable to claim that Nelson himself would have been very familiar on board
Blake’s flagship of 150 years earlier; but Jellicoe and Nimitz would have been quite
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lost on a century-older warship. “Sea power in an age of change” is thus the core
theme, and implicit title, of the present investigation.
1793–1815
Since this war ended with Napoleon’s surrender after being defeated by a great
land-coalition force at Waterloo in 1815, it seemed incumbent upon Mahan to
make his well-known claim that “those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which
the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world.”6
Writing then as a professor at the Naval War College, and as the advocate of a much
larger American Navy, his position was an understandable one. He had to convince
readers, including perhaps congressional skeptics, that sea power counted in world
affairs, and the British struggle against Napoleon offered him much evidence for
that claim. Later scholars have not contested this. After all, the 1793–1815 conflict in Western Europe was mainly a struggle between three naval nations, Britain,
France, and Spain, such that if any one side gained at sea the other was very adversely weakened; each intruded upon the other, and therefore navies very much
counted.7
The geography of these wars at sea was thus of overwhelming significance; it
intruded at every stage, and to a degree unimaginable in the modern jet age. Nothing here was new, for geography had played the same critical role in the five previous Anglo-Spanish-French conflicts between 1689 and 1783. Britain benefited, of
course, from its insularity and freedom from invasion by land; and after 1603 and
1707, by its union with Scotland. In the age of sail, it benefited from the prevailing
currents and winds that so often pinned the French fleets into their harbors, and
from an array of good naval bases from Devon to the Thames. It benefited to an
incalculable degree by the possession of Gibraltar (as it would again in 1940–43),
and also from its possession of Halifax, Kingston, and, very soon, Malta and the
Cape. But in a struggle against France and Spain geography did not favor Britain to
the extent it did in its wars against the Dutch, the Danes, or Wilhelmine Germany.
Franco-Spanish raiders and larger squadrons could get out to the Atlantic and beyond, and did so repeatedly; and they also, of course, possessed good harbors in
the Mediterranean itself. All these waters were contested space, therefore, which is
why the naval battles themselves (the Glorious First of June, Cape Saint Vincent,
Trafalgar, and, farther north, Camperdown and Copenhagen) were invested with
such importance and fought so keenly by each side. Little wonder that Mahan was
so impressed at the idea of a main battle force that would sweep all before it, and
thus ensure command of the oceans.
Since these were wars of endurance—twenty-three years of struggle—victory
would go to the power with the deepest purse and the greatest economic capacity.
Ostensibly, this would have been France, with more than twice the population of
Britain and a rich agricultural and commercial base, and a commensurate taxation
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capacity; but after Colbert’s earlier efforts, this potential was never realized, and
from the 1720s the advantage swung to a Walpolian Britain, which gave the country an adamantine political strength and an astounding creditworthiness. The hard
figures told the story; halfway through every great conflict, the U.K. Treasury could
continue to float loans (at much lower interest rates) when its rivals could not. As
Osterhammel explains, between 1688 and 1815 U.K. gross national product rose
threefold and taxation revenue fifteenfold; Britain could raise more than twice as
much in taxes as France.8 By the later stages of the war against Napoleon, the islandnation had become a gigantic export-producing machine. If France had been able
to shut it down, through the Continental System and other embargoes, London’s
war strategy would have shuddered to a halt. That never happened; Britain faltered (in 1797, when the Bank of England suspended specie payments), but its
insularity, ever-growing economy, political resilience, access to newer global markets, and strong naval edge kept it going. And it still had money to subsidize major
and minor European allies to take up the fight against Napoleon, by funding their
armies and providing their weapons. Again and again, French victories in the field
blew apart these coalitions; and every time they were reassembled and refunded,
France’s manpower bled a little more and its capacity to interrupt Britain’s space
grew less. Finally, Napoleon’s twin bouts of imperial overstretch, into Spain and
into Russia in 1812–14, gave London the chance to play all its cards—naval pressure, massive subsidies, a Wellingtonian army—to assist in toppling France’s gigantic bid for mastery.
The later historian is tempted to say: given the many above factors in Britain’s
favor, all that was needed was for it to maintain a strong and unchallengeable navy,
under steady and intelligent leadership. Such leadership for pursuing the war was
there, even with a stricken king and when cabinet coalitions were shaky. From the
very onset of the French Revolution, governments in London committed enough
funds to build a huge fleet of line-of-battle ships and cruisers, with supporting
dockyards, munitions, and manpower. While the system groaned frequently under
the immense strains of combating the joint Franco-Spanish fleets and their massive
resources, it never snapped. The final advantages—of Nelson’s unique charismatic
leadership in battle and the remarkably high quality of so many other admirals and
captains (Collingwood, Saumarez, Hood, Cochrane—where does the list stop?)—
can be added in here, but how exactly one weighs each of the above elements of
strength that made up Britain’s war machine is impossible.
What is clear is that one has here a rare historical example of national and naval
strength that was partly foreshadowed (in 1714 and 1763) but now came to full
fruition. The conflict had been so lengthy, and drained so many resources, that it
left all the other participants exhausted, winded, and in need of years of recovery.
Little wonder that the Prussian general Gneisenau afterward inveighed against that
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“blackguard” Napoleon whose ambitions had plunged the Continent into war, leaving Britain free to exploit the fruits of the world.9 In all this effort, the role of the
Royal Navy had counted so much—wherever I go, Napoleon complained, I find it
in the way—but it was as one strand, one part of the whole. Mahan was therefore
entirely justified in enthusing about the influence of sea power upon history here,
but it was an influence that had worked because all the other strands were in place
as well.
1815–1914
No period in the maritime history of the previous two thousand years came close to
the special strategic and political circumstances of the century after the surrender
of Napoleon. When Rome dominated at sea, it was merely over Mediterranean waters; Adm. Cheng Ho’s great expeditionary fleets came and went across the Indian
Ocean, without lasting impact; and Philip II’s navies were repeatedly challenged
in the Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean. But here, for the first time,
was a global maritime empire. To some degree, the post-1815 Pax Britannica can
be explained on negative grounds: it happened, and was allowed to happen, because the other major powers did not contest British naval predominance outside
Europe during these many decades. Certain European countries (Prussia, Portugal,
Greece, the Italian states) usually found the Royal Navy’s protection abroad a distinct benefit to their shipping and seamen in those midcentury decades of growing
free trade. The French and Russian navies posed sporadic threats, but on certain
other occasions were to be found cooperating with British naval forces, as in their
joint crushing of Mehemet Ali’s fleet at Navarino in 1827; or, at least in regard to the
French Navy, in shared large-scale operations in the Black Sea against Russia during the Crimean War. For a while after 1815 the fast, very heavy American frigates
gave the British Admiralty cause for concern, but American attention to sea power,
and to building a substantial national naval force, was never very sustained during
the nineteenth century.10
But the Pax Britannica also existed because a long line of British governments
and parliaments was determined to pay for command of the sea. There was no lack
of pressure by members of Parliament to keep naval budgets low, yet spending on
the fleets never fell to hopeless levels, and ironically it was the Liberal side of the
House that most insisted upon maintaining a decent navy—the more so to keep
Britain from being so weak internationally as to rely upon continental alliances.
But of course that political prejudice against entanglements rested conveniently
upon an economy which by the 1850s, in Hobsbawm’s calculation, produced twothirds of the world’s coal, half of its iron, and five-sevenths of its steel.11 Maritime
preeminence, imperial advantage, technological strength, and isolationist preference all nicely reinforced each other at this time, and no foreign competitor came
close, or seriously attempted to be a competitor.
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Moreover, the naval predominance that was the Pax Britannica was not significantly affected, at least for quite a long while to come, by the advent of steam
power and the Industrial Revolution. That may seem remarkable given that fossil
fuels could be found in many parts of the world, so competitors had at least the
raw potential for imitation and catch-up. But in the first instance what the Industrial Revolution did was to enhance vastly the already great economic and productive power of Britain itself, both vis-à-vis its traditional rivals (some of whom,
like France, were not so blessed in resources of coal and iron) and vis-à-vis nonEuropean societies in Africa and India that had not even the elemental capacities for Western-type modernization. As British manufactured goods streamed out
across the globe in the 1840s and 1850s, the world seemed to be ever more the “oyster” for the victors of Trafalgar and Waterloo. Thus, the rising exports of steam locomotives and railway equipment to the Rhineland and Pennsylvania seemed only
to tie such markets to British manufacturing centers and bring large profits, and
not to be enabling future world rivals. And it would be some time before the extensions of foreign railway networks began to create new centers of geopolitical power
in the American Midwest and across the Ukraine, far from the workings of any
future blockade. And since it was in south Wales that there occurred the very best
steaming coals for all types of ships, it seemed that industrialization merely gave
one further advantage in world power indices to a nation already almost unfairly
endowed by geographic and other advantages. The longer-term consequences of
the Industrial Revolution upon sea power were only to be appreciated, and then
just partly, in the final quarter of the century, when other powers began to close
the gap.12
One can gain a better understanding of all this if the “long nineteenth century”
in its naval dimensions is divided into three chronological subcategories: that between 1815 and circa 1885, described above; between 1885 and 1906; and between
1906 and the First World War. This at least was how it was in regard to the Royal
Navy’s all-important global fleet distributions, as they were amended in each of
these times. Geography of course could not change, but the relationship of the
leading naval powers to each other did change as admiralties adjusted their naval
programs, vessel types, and fleet dispositions, and the world’s leading naval power
then sought to respond. These three chronological cutoff points also reflected some
big changes in warship design, the increasingly stepped-up size of naval budgets,
as well as the arrangements of the active fleets. There were some exceptions to this
general three-part schema, but on the whole this breakdown can help readers of the
period understand and locate such well-known events as the coming of the TwoPower Standard, the Dreadnought “leap,” and Tirpitz’s naval laws.
Mention of these later and very rapid eruptions in naval matters again allows
the reader to see better why the maritime and geopolitical contours of the 1815–85
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years appear so relatively placid by comparison. Though there were significant
changes in naval architecture, there was little standardization as warships sprouted
a rich variety of profiles, funnels, masts (including sails), and gun calibers with little
or no standardization of type compared with, say, the post-1919 era. The greatest
war of the midcentury, the U.S. Civil War, had been overwhelmingly a land-based
struggle, with sea power operating along its fringes. Bismarck’s three successful
wars of unification in the 1860s were achieved without sea power being evoked at
all. The Anglo-French naval operations against Russia during the Crimean War
showed the difficulties of applying maritime pressure against such a landlocked,
agrarian nation. For long decades after 1815 not much of naval significance happened in the waters outside Europe apart from antislavery patrols and the Opium
Wars; later admirals’ memoirs could happily recall their frequent times as young
lieutenants visiting Valparaiso and Brisbane. The many doings described in Osterhammel’s recent Transformation of the World rested, lightly and easily, upon an almost invisible and softly applied British naval preeminence.13 An integrated world
of commerce and mainly peace was underpinned by the iron frames of the Royal
Navy.
The significance of sea power within the Great Power system increased significantly after the mid-1880s, when both the French and Russian governments,
already colonial rivals to Britain in the Mediterranean, Africa, the Far East, and
Southeast Asia, embarked upon sustained and very expensive programs of capitalship building. This so shook the British press and Parliament out of their complacency that successive London governments could never again be free of the charge
that they were underspending upon the Royal Navy, even when the Two-Power
Act (i.e., the Naval Defence Act of 1889) and various expensive successor bills were
announced.14 Naval spending ballooned, but so too did public agitations about a
foreign invasion of England, the loss of control of the Mediterranean, and the end
of the Pax Britannica.
If the British Admiralty and its planners were shaken by the sudden rise of the
French and Russian new navies, they had every reason to be so. Geographically,
those fleets would be very hard to handle. The fear was that fast and heavily gunned
French armored cruisers, speedier than any Royal Navy battleship and more powerful than any British cruiser, could operate out of such well-situated harbors as
Brest, Cherbourg, Toulon, Algiers, Dakar, Madagascar, Reunion (Indian Ocean),
Saigon, even French West Indian ports. Russian raiders could operate out of Vladivostok, and later Port Arthur. A combined Russian Black Sea fleet and a Frenchbased Mediterranean force might possibly threaten Constantinople and the Eastern Mediterranean. In that case, the critical British Empire trade routes through
the Mediterranean would have to be suspended (as they were, of course, between
1940 and 1943).
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All this offered a geostrategic nightmare, and one that seemed to have no obvious solution. Build and build as the Royal Navy did, could it really place strong
blockading squadrons off all the above ports all the time, if French and Russian
squadrons were to be based there? It would be an operational and logistical nightmare. How also could an offshore blockade work without grave danger if the
French chose to construct dozens of fast-attacking torpedo vessels (as they did),
experiment with minefields and longer-range torpedoes, and design submarines
of an ever-longer range? The close blockade was over, and the medium-distance
offshore blockade was already at severe risk.15
This was the critical naval dimension to the “crisis of Empire” situation that
faced British planners around the year 1900. Military disasters in South Africa
led to huge increases in British military spending, at once far larger than anything
spent upon the fleet. Russian military advances seemed to threaten across Asia. The
great powers were snapping up Chinese ports—and thus newer naval bases. A war
with France over the Nile Valley had just narrowly been avoided in 1898. Great new
navies were being laid down by the United States and Japan, rising extra-European
nations that would be impossible to blockade in any future war. The Pax Britannica was at an end, even before a great modern German battle fleet began to be laid
down in the North Sea. Had the German Navy remained modest and second-class
in size, and Germany stayed friendly throughout the Edwardian years, the British
global and imperial crisis would have remained. But the German Navy did not remain modest in size, nor did Germany stay friendly.
Viewed from this larger gloomy perspective, it is now easier to understand that
immense flurry of defense measures and newer naval policies that the British engaged in between about 1895 and 1906—measures that have drawn the attention
of a whole host of recent naval historians of these years.16 The two-power standard
was asserted again, and again. Battleships became larger and larger, to accommodate ever-bigger gun calibers, and at the same time became more and more heavily
armored, and faster and faster—and much more expensive in consequence. Giant,
fast, armored cruisers, even more pricey than battleships, were laid down. Flotillas of torpedo-boat destroyers were constructed, to protect those battleships from
attack. Advances were made in various new forms of fire control, each with their
impassioned claimants. Plans were also advanced for super-fast, heavily gunned
though lightly protected types of battle cruisers that could scout in advance of the
main battle fleet or range along imperial trade routes. Fresh undersea cables were
laid along those same imperial maritime routes. Harbor defenses from Dover to
Gibraltar, and from Toulon to Dakar, were expensively renewed. Qualitatively and
quantitatively, navies were altering fast in this period, but none felt the pressure
more than the number one naval power.
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The revolution in naval affairs that so threatened Britain, its imperial possessions and maritime routes, and the Royal Navy in the two decades between around
1885 and around 1905 was eventually handled, and greatly eased, not by some phenomenal new technological deus ex machina, as Admiral Fisher and other reformers sought, but through diplomacy—that is, by important changes in great power
relationships that took place between Britain and the other nations precisely in
these years. In the Mediterranean, Turkey, Spain, and Austria-Hungary remained
overall friendly, and Italy very much so. In the Far East, Japan signed an alliance
with Britain, crushed Russian land forces, and smashed the Russian battle fleet
(1905). In the Western Hemisphere, the rising American power was accommodated through territorial concessions and a political rapprochement. Most important
of all, Britain entered into a series of colonial agreements between 1904 and 1907
with its two greatest overseas rivals, France and Russia, which (provided they were
kept) took away their threats to the empire, and of course to the imperial sea-lanes.
The nightmares of the 1890s were receding, although it was understandable that
most admirals did not at first understand what was happening, and many feared
that the new French and Russian rapprochements might not last. By any objective
strategical measurement, however, Britain’s global position was far more secure by
1906 than it had been, say, in 1890. And, to repeat an earlier point, all these diplomatic realignments could, and most probably would, have taken place even had the
German fleet remained small and friendly.
Seen in this light, the final phase of the long nineteenth century (1906–14) is
easier to comprehend and requires only a few broad strokes here. The new German Navy was being built, by Tirpitz’s intent, to affect British policy and to make
London more amenable to Berlin. It was to be a very large but short-range battlefleet navy, and thus to have its greatest influence between Wilhelmshaven and the
Thames. German public opinion was now virulently hostile, and German diplomacy under the kaiser unpredictable. As pressures eased upon Britain’s world position, a new danger seemed to have arisen much closer to home. British warship
numbers were trimmed in the Far East, the Mediterranean, the West Indies, and on
lesser stations. Land for a new battleship base was prudently purchased at Rosyth
as early as 1903. The new Dreadnought battleship and Invincible-class battle cruiser
appeared after 1906; they had not been designed deliberately against Germany, of
course, but now they were there—and the swift German intention to follow suit
showed that the new High Seas Fleet would stay as the chief threat to Britain’s
maritime security, and the more frightening because so close. The Anglo-German
naval race consumed all the headlines, agitated the British Parliament, and gripped
successive British governments.17
But Britain’s security position was made much easier by the military-strategical
decisions of two men: Gen. Alfred von Schlieffen and Grand Adm. Alfred von
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Tirpitz. Schlieffen and the Prussian Army planners who followed him played such
a vital, albeit negative, role because they completely ruled out the diversion of their
armies for an invasion of England. It would have been very difficult to carry out
such an invasion in any case, but it simply was not going to happen, because the
Prussian General Staff ’s obsession throughout this time was the swift invasion of
France, via Belgium (possibly also via the Netherlands as well), as well as gigantic
campaigns in the east. This prospect meant that, like it or not, British governments
now had to consider a threat to the European land balance of power for the first
time in a century—a contingency for which the Royal Navy, not liking this at all,
would also have to adjust. And Tirpitz eased Britain’s strategical dilemmas, ironically, by his unwavering insistence upon constructing a German Navy solely, or
overwhelmingly, for deployment in the North Sea—the pre-1914 naval archives
show him firmly resisting all schemes to have a larger German naval presence in
the Mediterranean and outside Europe, as reducing the effect of his “lever point”
against Britain in home waters.18 So it was with reluctance that he viewed the existence of Souchon’s small force in the Mediterranean and of von Spee’s squadron
in the Far East. By the same token, Tirpitz opposed allocating large monies for
enhancing naval harbors in the German colonies. So long as he held office, British
imperial trade routes were not, despite any apprehensions, going to be in much
danger in the years before 1914.
The historian is left only to speculate how the naval strategical situation would
have looked had pre-1914 German governments decided instead to construct and
then deploy squadrons of fast, powerful cruisers and battle cruisers, and even lesser
squadrons, in ports in West Africa, Southwest Africa, East Africa, New Guinea,
Samoa, the Carolines, and Tsingtao, instead of laying down yet another expensive
battleship flotilla for the High Seas Fleet. Would this have seemed like a new version of that scarcely faded nightmare of powerful French squadrons at Dakar and
Madagascar? Probably not, because Germany could offer a far weaker logistical
support system to an overseas base network than could France. Yet because Tirpitz
prevailed in his fight against the German Admiralty Staff, that alternative strategy
did not happen. Instead, and ironically, the natural geographical advantages that
the Royal Navy had had against the Dutch challenge in the seventeenth century
now returned, almost as an act of strategic good fortune, to hem in the newer naval
challenge of the kaiser’s improperly named High Seas Fleet. Sea power had not diminished in importance, of course; it simply was returning to manifest itself in an
older, familiar locale.
1914–18
The prewar constellation of prior diplomatic arrangements, military preparations,
and the overall “correlation of forces,” as well as the unalterable geographical situation, thus set limits and opportunities for the workings of sea power after 1914,
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affecting both the Allies and the Central Powers alike. The existing military plans
and contractual arrangements of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany meant
that a vast land struggle, far from the sea, would take place once decision makers
in those capitals decided upon war rather than further negotiation. One of those
contracts—namely, France’s commitment to its ally Russia—triggered Berlin’s declaration of war upon Paris and brought the conflict to Western Europe as well.
While a fight against Russia and France seemed deeply satisfying to many among
Berlin’s leadership during the July crisis of 1914, the rigidity of their Schlieffen Plan
actually meant that Germany first attacked neutral Belgium, thus triggering the
intervention of Britain and its empire against the Central Powers, and turning the
struggle into a true “world” war. Wilhelmine Germany was now simultaneously
engaged in a massive land conflict and a premature maritime struggle against a far
larger naval power—all this, unsurprisingly, to Tirpitz’s dismay and frustration. In
his view, Berlin had unwisely and prematurely pushed for a conflict in 1914; there
was no sleepwalking into war here.19 And Tirpitz had fair cause for dismay, for,
while there were good prospects for a militarily efficient Germany to overcome its
next-door neighbors, at sea the odds were badly tilted against the High Seas Fleet.
Several early actions in the war confirmed Germany’s weaknesses overseas, but,
coincidentally, other events in the southern North Sea and at the Dardanelles suggested that sea power’s effectiveness along the littoral waters of a huge continent
had been greatly changed and reduced since the age of fighting sail. On the declaration of war, Germany’s two relatively small overseas squadrons were left exposed,
like foxes in an open field. Because Britain’s Far East ally, Japan, came immediately
into the war in order to seize Germany’s possessions in north China and the Central Pacific islands, Adm. Graf von Spee’s squadron had no alternative but to flee
across the entire Pacific to the tip of South America, where it smashed a very weak
Royal Navy cruiser group at Coronel (November 1914) before in turn being eliminated at the Battle of the Falkland Islands (December 1914) by a force of fast battle
cruisers sent out by Admiral Fisher from home waters. One could say that imperial
flotilla defense was working here, then, but afterward there was nothing for HMS
Inflexible and Invincible to do but to come home, to risk more dangerous closewater threats (HMS Inflexible was heavily damaged by Turkish shore batteries and a
mine at the Dardanelles, beached, and then recovered) or face Germany’s powerful
squadrons in the North Sea (HMS Invincible was sunk by plunging fire at Jutland).
Secondly, and even earlier, von Souchon’s Goeben and Breslau had fled through
the Mediterranean and forced themselves for refuge at Constantinople, thus partly
helping to bring Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers (also in
November 1914), which in turn led to Anglo-French counteractions and expansion across the Middle East. With an Allied naval blockade in operation in the
Atlantic and the Channel and from Gibraltar, and with all Germany’s overseas cable
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communications cut off, there would be no great naval campaigning in overseas
waters in this particular war. And Italy’s entry into the conflict (May 1915) kept
Austria-Hungary’s fleet bottled up as well. Naval clashes in the Baltic and Black
Seas were interesting, but local affairs. Only America remained as a major neutral
force, albeit tied by finance, trade, and communications much more to the Allied
side. So the greater part of this war was, in essence, a giant Mackinder-ite land
struggle, with surface navies operating at the margins; it could not help being so.20
The destruction of Germany’s prospects overseas suggested that the workings
of sea power were running in Britain’s direction, but further encounters pointed
to another, unsettling fact: the coming of certain nineteenth-century technologies, when converted into weapons systems, was going to curb the application of
maritime force along well-defended hostile shores, and even a bit farther out. In
October 1914, a single enemy mine sank the new battleship HMS Audacious off
northern Ireland, a stunning example of what one would later call “asymmetrical
warfare” and a precedent that deeply worried Jellicoe. Even before then, in September 1914, three large cruisers (HMS Aboukir, Hogue, and Crecy) patrolling off the
Dutch coast were sunk by a small, elderly U-boat, causing the loss of a staggering
1,400 British sailors. As Corbett put it in his official history, “nothing that had yet
occurred had so emphatically proclaimed the change that had come over naval
warfare.”21 Close blockade was supposed to have been given up as Admiralty practice years before the war; now it decidedly was.
This left the far easier practice of the distant blockade of Germany’s maritime
commerce, taking advantage of Britain’s favorable position over the entrances to the
North Sea. Yet the hoped-for “squeeze” upon the German economy did not work
as decisively as in prewar planning, partly because the Central Powers (with their
extensive grain fields of the east) were to be largely self-sustaining in food supplies
for much of the war, and partly because angry American protests about the interruption of neutral shipping slowed down the operation of the seaborne blockade
of German commerce.22 Economic warfare against the Central Powers took many
forms—the cutting of cable communications, the suspension of German credits,
the simple fact that the huge Anglo-German mutual trade spluttered to a halt (as
did, of course, all German-Russian and German-French economic exchanges), the
closing down of the access to British shipping for German goods, the purchase
of supplies overseas that might otherwise have gone to Germany, and the nowcautious inspection of neutral shipping on the high seas—but the effects of this
could not be swift, and the whole process was obviously much less visible to the
public and their governments than the battles of the Marne and Tannenberg. Ironically, of course, land warfare was also to show itself less decisive and promising
by the time of Ypres (1915), causing the generals on both sides to call for an evergreater share of resources and manpower they now needed for carrying out vast,
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industrialized warfare. All prewar planning assumptions, for land and sea, seemed
confounded.
While it was patently clear that in this war the Royal Navy could not operate in
the Baltic as it had done in the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars, Admiralty planners
and their pugnacious First Lord, Churchill, did still think that they could strike at
Constantinople and alter the outcome of the war in the Black Sea and across Eastern Europe itself.23 However, the disaster that hit the first naval operations against
the Dardanelles—the loss and crippling of so many British and French battleships
upon the Turkish-laid minefields on the single day of March 18, 1915—was not
only spectacular and devastating in itself. It finally confirmed that the older application of naval force against enemy shores was now impossible in a new age of
small, “killer” weapons like the mine, torpedoes, entrenched coastal gunnery, fast
torpedo boats, and submarines (the bombing of warships by aircraft had not yet
arrived).
Then the second stage of the Dardanelles campaign—the failure of ever-larger
Allied armies to break through at Gallipoli and advance upon Constantinople—
showed that the classic weapon of amphibious warfare was also crimped unless the
invading forces were to be far better equipped and trained than they were at this
time. Future militaries like the U.S. Marine Corps at Okinawa learned much from
studying the failures of the Allies at the Dardanelles.24 At the time, of course, that
meant nothing. What seemed to be happening was that while the Central Powers
were quite unable to shake the Allied command of the oceans, the Allies could do
little or nothing to hurt their foes from the sea. Worst of all, of course, France and
Britain also could do nothing to help their beleaguered Russian ally except, so their
high commands argued, by massively increasing land pressures along the Western
Front.
But the greatest confounding of the hopes of Allied sea power advocates lay
where they had expected a decisive blow against the German Navy to occur—in the
North Sea itself. Geography was not a friend to Jellicoe here. Enemy vessels operating from Wilhelmshaven could get to England’s east coast more swiftly than could
the Grand Fleet coming out of Scapa Flow, and even when the two navies met the
actions were fast, furious, confused, and attended by mists, poor communications,
and the failure of command and control. What therefore took place between 1914
and 1916 in these North Sea encounters was much more of a cat-and-mouse game
than a decisive battle-fleet action like Trafalgar. Early German bombardments of
the towns of Scarborough and Whitby shocked the British nation, so the Admiralty had to conjure up a credible response in these new and trying circumstances.
The Grand Fleet could not be relocated south with individual battleship squadrons
based in the Tyne, Humber, Harwich, and the Thames, for bringing them together
again off, say, Scarborough Head would be a signals nightmare (signals turned out
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to be a great Royal Navy weakness), and the possibility of one of them getting into
a running fight with Hipper’s dangerous battle cruisers or even Scheer’s entire fleet
was too daunting to contemplate. The best that could be done, and this was sensible
enough, was to base Beatty’s battle cruisers at Rosyth and to fill southern ports such
as Harwich with cruiser and destroyer flotillas—and rely upon the Germans’ loose
wireless chatter to indicate when the High Seas Fleet might be emerging. Thus
the Grand Fleet would stay far up north—leaving Jellicoe, however, with another
operational problem: should it, upon alert, steam south as fast as possible, shrugging off the risk of newly strewn enemy mines, or proceed instead at around eight
knots behind a screen of minesweepers, making things easier for U-boat attack,
and being also possibly too late to help an outnumbered Beatty? Clearly, Rodney
and Nelson had had no such problems.
All these reminders of space and weather puts the Anglo-German North Sea
surface fleet encounters—off the Yorkshire coast, the Dogger Bank, even Jutland—
in their context. The historian of an exact century later should be wary of being
smart after these events. Jellicoe, Beatty, and Tyrwhitt were nervous, excited, and
worried about a battle scenario that could emerge from the mists in less than fifteen
minutes, and so, surely even more so, were Hipper and his bleary-eyed lookouts
on the German side. Yet it is impossible to accept Churchill’s hyperbolic claim that
Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon. While the
Dogger Bank clash delivered to the Germans a salutary spanking and a warning,
Jutland in turn gave the thinly protected British battle cruisers a hammering and
the nation a blow to its pride; gave both historians and participants the stuff for
endless postmortems, claims and counterclaims; and also gave rise to a large literature, much predictable and of relatively low value.25 It has never been shown—for
how could it be?—that even if the Grand Fleet had lost, say, six capital ships and
not three, the overall maritime balance the day after Jutland would have been much
different. Nor does a British claim much matter that, had its deficient shells been
replaced before the war, the hits that occurred on six further German battleships
would have been fatal ones. Improved fire control here or improved shells there
were simply not the point. Strategically, Jutland changed nothing. The British nation was understandably shocked at the loss of 6,094 seamen. But on July 1, 1916,
on the first day of the Somme, the British Army lost 19,240 men out of a total of
57,500 casualties—and the British press moved on. The German High Command
didn’t care about Jutland, nor about an invasion of England. So what was Jellicoe
to have lost?
The historian can be brief about what was left.26 If the German Admiralty wished
to bring the British nation to its knees after 1916, it seemed it had no practical alternative but to initiate full-scale and unrestricted U-boat warfare against mercantile commerce in the Atlantic, whether Allied or neutral. It thus traded off a high
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political risk against its increasing post-Jutland naval ineffectiveness, and by April
1917 that risk playing had led to the entry of the United States into the conflict.
That was simply too much. Provoking the British Empire into this struggle ensured
that Germany would not win the First World War; provoking the Americans also to
enter meant that Germany would lose. The odds, as A. J. P. Taylor pointed out sixty
years ago, were simply too great.27
This did not mean that the naval situation for the Allies immediately became
any easier, but it did become very different. Success in the maritime conflict was
now counted by the tonnage of merchantmen sunk versus the number of U-boats
destroyed and, above all, by the successful flow of New World foodstuffs, munitions, and fighting men to British and French ports during 1917 and 1918. And
the losses of merchant ships were huge and frightening—3.6 million tons in six
months—yet they were never enough to achieve the German Admiralty Staff ’s purpose. And the British return to the older practice of convoy gave the operational
and tactical advantage to the Allied escorting fleets; if the U-boats wanted to score,
they would have to attack the convoys and thus provoke counterattack.
Obviously, in this great struggle, neither the Grand Fleet nor the High Seas Fleet
counted very much, except as a manpower drain, and as neutralizing each other. To
return to a consideration of the three grand theories about sea power mentioned
above, one might conclude that the eventual Allied victory in late 1918 chiefly
came, not from a big battle-fleet struggle in the North Sea (Mahan) but from the
linked strategies of keeping open the North Atlantic lines of communication (Corbett) while beating off Ludendorff ’s bid for land supremacy (Mackinder). This was
difficult for fleet admirals and their later historians to swallow.
This did not, of course, mean that sea power had not worked at all, but that it
had operated, and worked, in a very different context from that anticipated by most
prewar planners and policy makers. When the conflict opened, the signal was sent
out that “The King’s Ships Were at Sea,” and so they were, or at least the smaller
patrolling vessels and the submarines were.28 But the heavier surface warships came
out infrequently, not only because the waters were dangerous but also, importantly,
because their actual presence at sea was ever less necessary. The preponderance of
naval force, plus geography, had ensured Allied naval supremacy in any case. It just
was harder to explain that when the war ended and the leaders of the victor powers
assembled at Versailles. The advocates of the influence of sea power had a far easier
time of it after 1815 and 1945.
1919–39
There was to be no long century of relative naval peace following 1919, but in
the mere twenty-year interlude a remarkable amount did occur that would affect
the workings of navies. History speeded things up, as it were. One hundred years
afterward, one can see rather better than did contemporaries why the very special
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international and domestic circumstances after the First World War wrought havoc
upon any traditional attempts to develop a naval policy; indeed, wrought havoc
upon the usual ways of thinking about sea power itself. The new features to this altered strategical landscape were daunting, and admirals everywhere, and the policy
makers who controlled them, were at first understandably daunted, distracted, and
confused by all this.29 By the second half of the 1920s, however, the landscape of
world affairs had settled down a bit and seemed altogether more reassuring.
With a suspicious U.S. Senate and American public forcing Woodrow Wilson
and his successors to pull back from leading the efforts to create a post-1919 world
order, it was left to policy makers in London, Paris, Rome, and other capitals to
shape the contours within which navies would operate and naval planners would
work. What is clear is that the challenges uppermost in the minds of Lloyd George
and his political contemporaries were very definitely not those of, say, Admirals
Jellicoe and Beatty.
How could they be? Germany and Austria-Hungary had collapsed, and there
was the threat of international mayhem across Eastern Europe as new nationalist
forces strove to establish boundaries and governments. Most of the regular armies
of the First World War had dissolved and gone home, leaving those of France,
Belgium, and Italy, intact if vastly reduced. Polish, White Russian, and Bolshevik forces fought on, with Lenin eventually gaining a breathing space for his new,
puzzling regime. All this, of course, took place on land, indeed on Mackinder’s
very “heartland” of the Ukraine, and therefore had little to do with the Western
admiralties’ efforts to create their postwar international order. Urgent European
issues—on boundaries, war debts, reparations, plebiscites, working out League of
Nations practices, and carrying out old-fashioned-type great-power diplomacy at
places like Lausanne and Locarno—took most of the headlines of the day; to France
especially all this was crucial. In parallel to negotiations over the Saarland and upper Silesia were those over the future boundaries of the entire Middle East, but even
here naval considerations played no role because there was no challenge to British and French imperial dominance, and nor was there in Africa. Commonwealth
navies were shrinking and Commonwealth armies dissolving, following the American lead. All the civilized (sic) Western world seemed to want was for its armies to
come home, allowing governments instead to focus upon reconstruction and social
priorities, in which context all defense expenditures had to be brutally cut. Generals were now despised, and navies told to find their place and think themselves
lucky that their budgets were not further slashed.
Despite the navalists’ dismay, this was not the end of sea power, and in fact
the setting of reduced, economy-based priorities by the governments in Washington, London, and Paris gave navies a rather good, if limited, circumstance in
which to “find their place.” All the admirals—including the Japanese, French, and
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Italian—kicked, screamed, and protested as they were forced into the straitjacket of
the powerful clauses of the Washington Treaties of 1921–22, but when their navies
emerged from this harrowing experience into the placid years of the later 1920s
things did not seem so bad after all. Even the very fact that warship sizes were
standardized by displacement and gun caliber grew to be reassuring to planners
and designers; a heavy cruiser had eight-inch guns, a light cruiser less than sixinch guns. Each class—carriers, battleships, cruisers—was neatly described and
circumscribed.
The German Navy was no more, chiefly sunk at its own hands; the French Navy
was under firm political control; the Italian Navy small and inward-looking; and no
other European navies counted. Sea power, as manifested by large fleets, was held
by the three great navies of Britain, the United States, and Japan, and all were being
compelled to find their diminished position within their nation’s current list of priorities. Treaties established the maritime status quo regarding territories and naval
bases across the Far East and Pacific; and in the Atlantic and Mediterranean the
Royal Navy enjoyed an uncontested superiority, with the French and Italian navies
well behind. The American and British admiralties were still going to quarrel over
cruiser sizes and numbers right through until the London Naval Treaty of 1930, but
this was a mild affair compared with prewar passions. A better expression of what
was going on might be captured in photographs of the great harbor of Hong Kong
in these years, with the 5th RN Cruiser Squadron at anchor, under their awnings,
while in the distance a few American warships peacefully took in fuel and other
supplies. In the Mediterranean, French, British, and Italian vessels paid port visits.
Not much else was going on. The age of frantic navalism was over.
The most interesting aspect to the story of evolving sea power in these years
was not, therefore, navies, and certainly not traditional battle fleets, but the emerging newer technologies of warfare, especially in the air. Both the Royal Navy and
the U.S. Navy experimented keenly with “flattops” after 1919, and although those
very early vessels like HMS Argus and USS Langley were small and primitive it is
really remarkable how swiftly the speed, displacement, size, and striking power of
subsequent carriers became [greater]. HMS Ark Royal, for example, was laid down
less than twenty years after Argus had put to sea. And the later carriers had to be so
much bigger because aircraft in general were so much more powerful—the ships
had to have a longer space for both takeoff and landing. The new dive-bombers,
torpedo bombers, and high-level aircraft flew more swiftly, carried greater armaments, and came in so fast. The admirals may have pooh-poohed Billy Mitchell’s
claims in 1920, but by the late 1930s it is noticeable that all heavy warships, battleships, cruisers, and carriers were having ever more antiaircraft guns fitted. More
importantly—at least as far as the Royal Navy was concerned, since it operated
chiefly in European waters—the threat might come more from land-based air
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power than from enemy carrier aircraft. Early in the First World War, mines and
torpedoes had made a close-in naval blockade a thing of the past. But what if the
threat of land-based aircraft pushed the more powerful navy into operating farther
and farther from the shore? How limited was sea power’s “influence” then?
The years after 1936 saw changes come thick and fast for all the major navies.
The historically distorting naval “holiday” in capital-ship building was at an end,
as were the total caps on fleet tonnages. Naval construction surged forward, in the
British case in the form of the new King George V–class battleships, Illustrious-class
fleet carriers, Town-class cruisers, and flotillas of fleet destroyers.30 The American
Navy also grew rapidly in the late 1930s, although it was not until the third VinsonTrammel Act of June 1940 and the Two-Ocean Navy Act of the following month
that legislation went through that would make it the largest naval force in the world
by 1944. The three revisionist, fascist states were also investing heavily in new
fleets. Italy was laying down powerful, fast battleships and heavy cruisers (although
no aircraft carriers). Hitler’s huge rearmament schemes also encompassed the
German Navy, and if its initial laying downs were not large, they were enough to
have London seek the controversial Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1936), a
desperate effort to achieve a one-power standard in home waters while also being
able to send a fleet to the Far East as large as Japan’s. But the Japanese were also rebuilding, way beyond that calculus. Everyone was building, running faster to keep
up, just as the shapes of the wartime coalitions of power took shadowy form. The
Axis trio was moving: Italy in Ethiopia (1935), in Spain (1937), and in the Balkans
(1939); Japan in China (1937); and Hitler across central Europe (1938–39). Britain
and France stood once more together, diplomatically and navally, by 1939. The
USSR desperately bought time, as did a neutralist, geographically favored United
States.
In sum, by the eve of the Second World War sea power—always a different thing
from navies, or from naval policies, or from naval technologies—possessed a form
both familiar and yet unfamiliar. Command over the surface waters of the Atlantic
Ocean, and of the Mediterranean, was being asserted, by the battle fleets of the prevailing Western navies (Mahan); and plans were simultaneously being made to protect the enormous yet scattered flocks of individual merchant ships making their
way to port (Corbett). One giant commercial map of November 1937 shows the
streams of little dots headed to British ports from La Plata, from the West Indies,
around the Cape, past Freetown, through the Mediterranean.31 And even two years
later those Elder Dempster, Blue Funnel, P&O, and Compagnie de Suez merchant
vessels must have all seemed reasonably safe. The Axis navies were locked into the
North Sea and Mediterranean, and in the absence of a High Seas Fleet the surface
balance of power was even more favorably tilted toward London and Paris than it
had been in 1914.
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But those vast numbers of Allied merchantmen were also more vulnerable because the greatest threat to their security now came not from hostile surface raiders
but from an undersea menace that challenged the power of regular fleets to claim
command of the oceans and threatened merchant fleets, grain carriers, oil tankers,
and ocean liners alike. This was not completely new, of course; as described above,
the early submarines had already shown their threatening capacities, in the North
Sea by 1916, in the Atlantic by 1917. But many a traditional admiral, in Japan no
less than in the West, had tried to brush away that fact, and the cozy international
scene and naval holidays of the 1920s helped to perpetuate the illusion. And illusion it was. Four centuries of surface sea power, from Hawkins’s Revenge to the new
Ark Royal itself (sunk by a German submarine on November 13, 1941), had been
an impressive historical “long phase” in the larger story of the advance of the West.
But a new age had commenced, lasting to the present, whereby surface sea power,
when under way upon the high seas, would always be vulnerable to an attack out
of the deep.
In those same few years, from roughly 1930 to 1940, the engine power, speed,
carrying capacity, and range of the modern bomber aircraft greatly increased in
size. This became a mixed bonus to navies. The striking power and reach of the
newer Japanese, American, and British carriers rose greatly, but so did the danger
from their foes’ carrier fleets, and the nascent threat from land-based aircraft (from
Stuka dive-bombers to the later high-level B-17s) was a completely new factor.
While the Anglo-French surface fleets stood in great numerical superiority over
those of their foes at the end of the 1930s, what did that mean if hostile air power
could threaten their security, and thus their operating maritime effectiveness, up to
one hundred or more miles off a theater of war? What did it mean in the Pacific and
Southeast Asia if a newer, Japanese, carrier-based air power threatened the Allied
hold over the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore? What did it mean, closer to
home, when Italian land-based air power threatened to drive its foes’ fleets out of
the central Mediterranean?
When war broke out again in 1939, therefore, the Royal Navy may have been
still the leading navy by count of the numbers, and to this could be added the
considerable French fleets, plus the preponderance in naval bases possessed by the
Anglo-French powers. Yet number counting alone clearly was not a true measure
of the strategical balances. In September 1939, as Churchill resumed his position as
First Lord, the British Admiralty proudly announced, “Winston Is Back!,” suggesting that things were [again] much the same as in 1914. They were not, on at least
two significant counts. While Italy and Japan remained initially neutral, they were
obviously potential foes and had to be regarded as such, giving the Royal Navy a
much more serious fleet distributional problem than it had had in 1914. And, secondly, there was now the question of how much air power’s potential would be of
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greater advantage to Britain’s foes than to the number one maritime nation itself.
Finally, looming in the background, although a concern of only a few thoughtful
observers of geopolitics, there was the even larger question of how Western European maritime power would fare in a new era structured by the emergence of giant
nations—real superpowers.
1939–45
The Second World War was so immense that it is better understood as five great
(and interrelated) conflicts rather than as a single struggle for supremacy. From
1937 until 1945, a gigantic land war raged throughout much of China, as the Imperial Japanese Army committed over one million men to crush the Nationalists, who
were in turn trying to crush the Communists. From 1941 onward, an even greater
land struggle took place along the entire western front of the USSR in a fight to the
death between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army (with approximately three million German and five million Soviet men in the initial fighting alone). Across the
vast distances of the Pacific Ocean, with outlier campaigns that ranged westward to
the Indian border, a third great struggle, mainly maritime-amphibious, was waged
between Japan’s forces and those of the American-Australian-British commands
and forces. Eight thousand miles away, and starting over two years earlier, another
geographically widespread war was fought between Britain and its allies and the
German-Italian coalition; its scope was small in 1939–40, though it soon ranged
from Archangel to Abyssinia, and from Newfoundland to Egypt, and all the waters in between. And from 1942 onward, a great Anglo-American double strategic
bombing campaign was unleashed against the Third Reich from hundreds of British (and later Sicilian-Italian) air bases, as another, and independent, form of winning the war.
All five grand campaigns were interconnected, to a greater or lesser extent, with
the Chinese-Japanese War having the fewest links to the other fighting. All five
campaigns have each attracted a vast historiography, with the majority of the writings focusing solely on their own zones of battle, often laying claim to its significance for the final victory, sometimes even querying the size or the importance of
another campaign.32 This is not necessary in any proper assessment of the influence
of sea power upon the Second World War, for the significance of the great battles
of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean are incontestable; and it is clear that
the Anglo-American leadership saw those theaters as interlinked, as they shifted
warships, air squadrons, and landing craft from one to the other as they judged
necessary. And there are other linkages: neither the giant Anglo-American strategic bombing campaign nor the Normandy landings were possible without the
Allied naval escorts getting the invaluable convoys safely across the North Atlantic;
the bombing of German railways and submarine pens hurt U-boat production and
crippled overall Wehrmacht communications; and seaborne/landborne supplies
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from the Western Allies gave far greater help to the Red Army than is usually acknowledged, while the same strategic bombing also significantly diverted large resources of German manpower and material to home defense that could have been
used on the Eastern Front.33 As the war went on, certain Luftflotte Fliegerkorps
were juggled by Goering’s staff between the Mediterranean, Eastern, and French/
Atlantic fronts, just as many British warships went from Mediterranean operations
to Arctic convoy duties to Atlantic campaigning. Few if any leaders and their advisers viewed the war with complete balance, and holistically, although the meetings
of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff did their best in this regard.
Viewing sea power within this larger, grand-strategical framework best lets historians see where and how it worked, as well as where it played little or no role.
In the hard-fought campaigning of 1939 to 1942 in the Western theaters of war—
where Britain fought to maintain itself as the major military power—sea power’s
importance was undoubted, and was virtually everywhere. The Battle of the Atlantic, where hostilities began on the first day, was, after all, the longest campaign
of the war, and convoys were already under attack and Royal Navy warships being
sunk even during the so-called Phony War period. The diplomacy of the late 1930s
had set up the battlefield: Hitler’s attack upon Poland drew France and Britain into
the fighting, which then escalated greatly with the explosive German assaults upon
the Low Countries, Denmark, and Norway. Those losses to the Western alliance
would have been great enough, but in May–June 1940 the largest strategical change
since Napoleonic times occurred when France itself was toppled.
In less than two months, therefore, Britain had forfeited all its usual geographical advantages, save that incomparable one of being an island-state, protected by
its moat. Its control of the two exits from the North Sea was no more. Back in the
late 1920s, an obscure strategic writer named Rear Adm. Wolfgang Wegener had
argued that in a future war the only way that Germany could escape the geographical “trap” that it had occupied in 1914–18 would be to have naval bases in Norway
or in western France; now it had both.34 This huge transformation of the balances
made the fighting at sea ever more important and fierce. The Royal Navy lost many
ships itself as it mauled its German foe badly in the Norwegian campaign. As it
pulled the British and French armies out of Dunkirk, it encountered more losses
from Luftwaffe attacks. German bombers hammered away at British shipbuilding
yards. German submarines, from their new advanced bases, punished the convoys
severely.
Italy’s entry into the war, just after the fall of France, made an awful strategic
situation for Britain now close to catastrophic.35 The loss of the French ally and
the entry of the Italian fleet involved a “swing” of literally hundreds of warships,
and even when the French fleet was brutally neutralized the plain fact was that
Britain no longer had control of the Mediterranean. For the next two and a half
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years that sea became the most contested naval theater in all of history, and warships and merchantmen littered the seabeds from off Crete to the approaches to
Malta. In these years, without a doubt, the Royal Navy had its own “finest hour.” In
these years, as Churchill and his cabinet realized, keeping command of the sea was
elemental, vital, urgent . . . and so very precarious. The reader of the narrative of
a Malta convoy—say, the epic Operation PEDESTAL convoy battle of August 11–13,
1942—comes away awed at the intensity of the fighting by the British, Italian, and
German units thrown into the struggle.36
The Battle of the Atlantic was even larger, more widespread, and more costly;
in 1940, the Allies lost 3.9 million tons of merchant shipping, chiefly to surface
attacks and U-boats but some also to German aircraft and to mines; in 1941 that
total jumped to 4.3 million tons, including seven merchant ships in the foray by
the cruiser Hipper; and in 1942 the total was a terrifying 7.8 million tons.37 Then
the fourth year of the campaign started badly for the convoys. It was shortly after March 1943, when no fewer than four convoys had been torn into by U-boat
wolf pack attacks and some 627,000 further tons lost, that the official Admiralty
record read, “The Germans never came so near to disrupting communications between the New World and the Old as in the first twenty days of March, 1943.”38
Here, clearly, was Corbett’s claim that sea power equaled command of the maritime
routes most clearly evidenced. Here also was made clear the stark fact: unless control of the sea routes to Britain was maintained, there would be little or no strategic
bombing (the fuel for the air squadrons could only come by tanker) and no Allied
landings in France (for the equipment for two million U.S. soldiers could not cross
the Atlantic unless it was protected).
It is true that certain other Atlantic convoys were being successfully routed to
avoid the U-boats altogether and thus successfully make it to the Clyde and Liverpool. And it is also true that the enormous American shipbuilding effort was by
this stage producing millions of tons of additional merchant shipping (11.5 million
tons in 1943).39 Yet it is not at all certain that, had the U-boat packs not been driven
out of the North Atlantic by the extraordinary Allied counteroffensives of April
to June 1943, those additional stocks of shipping would have made much of a difference; if undefeated at sea, Dönitz’s increasingly larger wolf packs surely would
have sunk more and more ships, and the dreadful losses of merchant-ship crews
clearly was not sustainable. So the amazingly swift change of fortune that followed,
with the German Navy losing forty-one U-boats in May 1943 alone, actually meant
that a strategic watershed had been crossed. With the Allied control of the Atlantic
convoy routes never again in such dire danger, the first of the Casablanca military
directives had been achieved. Naval specialists will energetically debate which of the
newer weapons of war made the greatest contributions to this sharp defeat of the
U-boats (the list would include the coming of long-range patrol aircraft, the arrival
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of the escort carriers, the astounding miniature radar [cavity magnetron] sets, plus
hi-fi signals detection, improved depth charges, homing torpedoes, hunterkiller groups, and ULTRA signals-intelligence decrypts).40 But the chief point is that
the greatest struggle ever for command of the sea had been fought, with the defending navies triumphing after a long, bloody contest.
With that vital maritime campaign won, the Anglo-American alliance could
move to the next stages of the Casablanca military agenda and commence the
amphibian counteroffensive against the Third Reich’s vulnerable, overextended,
southernmost holdings. Geography again favored the Allies, for it was a lot easier
to move invasion armies from the Clyde and Virginia to the shores of Morocco
and Algeria than it was for the German High Command to send divisions from the
Balkans to North Africa—especially at a time when the Wehrmacht was involved in
the grinding maw that was Stalingrad. The Anglo-American forces were also lucky
in that their large-scale landings were on undefended beaches—there was opposition neither to the large-scale Sicily landings in July 1943 nor to crossing the Straits
of Messina into Italy proper the next month. Still, the Admiralty took no chances to
ensure that these invasions went undisturbed; for example, not only did it provide
enormous naval and aerial close support for the actions to take the Algerian ports,
but it sent a heavily augmented Force H from Gibraltar into the Central Mediterranean to deter any sorties by the Italian or Vichy French navies—altogether four
fleet carriers, five smaller carriers, and six battleships were involved.41
All this experience proved immensely useful in the following year, when the
Allies at last launched the largest amphibious operation of all time, against the
Normandy beaches. All the Mediterranean commanders had been brought home
(Eisenhower, Ramsay, Montgomery, Patton, and so on), as were the most experienced army divisions, and of course the navies and the amphibious units. In a
very real degree, the Allied invasion of June 1944 was the apotheosis of Western
sea power—the Admiralty insisted upon calling this “Operation NEPTUNE”—but
the historian has also to note how integrated the naval side was with the forces of
air power and land power. Five armies marched ashore on June 6, while no less
than 11,400 (!) aircraft were aloft that day over western France and the Channel.
German torpedo boats and U-boats were ordered to interrupt the invasion, but
they all understood this was a suicide mission and called it so.42 In other words,
the entire littoral of Western Europe was under Allied aerial dominance. (One can
again notice the difference with the situation around 1917, when Jellicoe’s fleets
kept carefully to the other side of the North Sea.) The D-day operation was indeed
stupendous, and yet in the very same month of June 1944 the Red Army launched
its most enormous land advance against the Third Reich yet, Operation BAGRATION, involving 1,700,000 troops.

43

44

THE HATTENDORF PRIZE LECTURES, VOLUME 1

By contrast, the battle of the Pacific was a war concerning sea power through
and through. Japan’s first six months of expansion, using its fleets, air forces, and a
relatively small military force to seize an astonishing amount of territory, ranging
from the Philippines to the Burma-India border, was spearheaded by an extremely
well-equipped and well-trained carrier force accompanied by supporting cruiser
and destroyer flotillas and expeditionary armies. The Royal Navy especially was ill
prepared for this and suffered defeat after defeat, with the loss of Prince of Wales
and Repulse, the stunning surrender of Singapore, and the further losses in the Indian Ocean. America’s losses, of the Philippines and the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor,
were even greater; but the critically strategic position of Hawaii was not taken, nor
was the U.S. carrier fleet at all damaged, and both were to be of immense value
when the counteroffensive came.
Tokyo’s aim was to establish a secure perimeter ring around its recently acquired
possessions and then, nourished by the oil fields of Sumatra and Borneo that had
been the real object of its southern drive, to resume its massive landward compaigns into mainland China. America’s aim was to recover all the territories lost,
to smash the Japanese forces in the Pacific, and to inflict an overwhelming defeat
upon the Japanese nation itself. There would be no great landmass over which this
war would be fought, but instead vast distances at sea, with the advantage going to
the side that readjusted best to the novel logistical and operational requirements.
And there would also be no great Battle of the Atlantic fight over convoys. The reinforcement route from America’s West Coast to Australia was not contested, and in
any case the Japanese submarine force did not focus upon a war against merchantmen but acted in support of its own battle fleets. And the American submarine
attacks upon Japanese merchant shipping, while murderously effective after the
torpedo defects had been remedied, came late in the day, in 1944 and 1945.
By that stage, the main contours of the war in the Pacific had become evident,
with sea power playing the central role, albeit in a new hybrid form that merged it
with air power and amphibian power. This was most clearly manifested in the massive forces that were assembled under Admiral Nimitz’s Central Pacific Command
and in the operations they carried out in an irreversible drive across the Pacific, island group by island group: from Hawaii to the Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls,
Carolines, and Marianas, then on to Iwo Jima and Okinawa and the approaches
to Japan. Although every one of these operations had their own separate features,
there was a common operational pattern: the arrival of a large number of carrier
task forces to gain control of the air and punish any Japanese warships and bases
(including major ones, like Rabaul) in the region; the offshore pounding by heavy
cruisers and battleships—in their new, non-Mahanian role—of the island’s land
defenses; and then the amphibious assault itself.43 The land fighting was always ferocious, but the garrisons were isolated, and no American assault was thrown back.
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The last great Japanese counterattack was in their multipart operation at Leyte Gulf
(October 1944), finally involving their Main Fleet. In retrospect, one can see that
even this operation, with its various subplots to trap some of the American squadrons, would not have stayed the offensive tide for long; the U.S. economy, eight or
possibly ten times greater than that of Japan, had now geared up to full production.
Around the middle of 1943, that great shift in the global power balances that
had been building up, tectonically, since the 1890s and more obviously after the
huge American defense spending near the end of the First World War showed itself
in full display. In June 1943, the first of the new, fast, Essex-class fleet carriers, the
USS Essex itself, slipped into Pearl Harbor. By August it was joined by another, the
new USS Yorktown, and afterward by USS Intrepid—and twenty-one more. A new
class of light fleet carriers was also streaming into the Pacific, accompanied by fast
new destroyers and heavy and light cruisers. The mighty sixteen-inch-gun Iowaclass battleships were not far behind. A galvanized American shipbuilding industry
was also completing fast oilers to accompany the future long-range operations of
the carrier groups, and hundreds and hundreds of landing craft for future amphibian landings on the scattered Japanese-held islands. And, from Seattle (Boeing) to
Long Island (Grumman), the U.S. aircraft industry poured out 85,898 aircraft in
1943 alone, and a staggering 96,318 in 1944.44 Nothing compared.
All this now dated those older disputes between sea power and land power advocates, as Leo Amery had so presciently guessed it would when he made his amazingly insightful commentary upon Mackinder’s “Geographical Pivot of History”
paper of April 1904.45 The chief thing to understand now was neither the display
of great warship fleets occupying the high seas nor the successful control of the
routes of trade, nor even the fight to defeat the giant Nazi land empire—all of them
vital, epic, remarkable in their different ways—but the coming of continent-wide
superpowers of “vast munitioning potential” that brought the winning of wars to a
new level of force projection. In this narrative, one can certainly see how sea power
influenced the outcome of the Second World War, not as the determinant but as the
many-sided instrument of Allied force projection, in specific theaters, to a specific
degree.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Sea power had played an enormously important part in the outcome of the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. One hundred years later, however, during the
second “Great War,” of 1914–18, it seemed both to participants and historians to
play a far less significant role in influencing the result of that conflict. Yet twentyfive years after that, in the epic global struggle of the Second World War, sea power
once again claimed an indisputable “influence.” This curious and remarkable discrepancy has never really been explained by naval historians. Nor is the reader
helped very much in understanding the difference by drawing from the writings of
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any one of the three great theorists of modern geopolitical thought concerning sea
power and land power, Mahan, Corbett, and Mackinder, because each argued and
composed, understandably, within the limits of his time and his perspective. Each
had magnificent insight, yet saw but a part of the struggle for world power. Still,
what they saw, and what they argued, helps us greatly to understand the puzzle.
The best way of helping us comprehend the puzzle is to think about contested
space, that is, the struggle by every large and small power to defend its own spheres
of influence and to invade and grasp the enemy’s. In the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars the emperor not only sought to dominate his immediate continental land space but to move into Britain’s—in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, Egypt, the Near East, and also in the Atlantic—through the assembling and
deployment of large, threatening, Franco-Spanish fleets. So, from the beginning of
the conflict until 1805, the struggle was indeed determined by vast, overpowering
force upon the sea, that is, by large consolidated battle fleets that could drive the
enemy’s forces away and gain control of the central commons. Great fleet fights,
prefigured by those in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the War of the Spanish Succession,
and the Seven Years’ War, occupied the center of the stage. From this Mahan drew
his theory about what constituted the essence of sea power: the superior battle fleet.
Yet strategic space was also being fought over in two other ways during the
struggle against Napoleon, and particularly after 1805. Here of course naval warfare was far less glamorous—Trafalgar had been won, but Nelson was dead—yet
other battles for strategic “space” were being fought. There were the really interesting fights in the eastern seas, the struggle for the Baltic, the frigate encounters in
the Mediterranean, and the French privateer wars against British commerce on
the seas. The latter, being so much more of concern to Corbett, was just a part of
the economic warfare waged during these years between Britain and Napoleonic
France that encompassed mutual blockades, the Continental System, the use of
credit, and the British subsidies to the land armies of its European allies.46 Just because an epic, single-day naval battle had not taken place did not mean that sea
power after 1806 was not being exerted—and felt.
Finally, fearing a Napoleonic domination of western and central Europe, the
British leadership felt it had no choice but to contest the emperor’s own continental
space, seeking to defeat him in many ways, from encouraging and funding coalitions of friendly land powers to pull him down from power, to the actual deployments of the British Army, in the Peninsula, in southern France, and eventually in
Belgium. From Helsinki to Flanders and Dover, down to Lisbon and Gibraltar and
on via Naples to the Bosporus, Britain sought to put a wrap around the emperor’s
efforts to break out, holding on to the rimland (sic) until there was sufficient coalition force to win at the heartland. This was a long and frequently unsuccessful
grand strategy which only saw its successful realization in the battles of Borodino
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(1812), Leipzig (1813), and Waterloo (1815)—many leagues from Mahan’s far-off
fleets, even if sea power had decidedly affected the outcome of this long struggle.
During the mid-eighteenth century, it is sometimes argued, Britain had been torn
between a “maritime” and a “continental” strategy; in bringing Napoleon down,
there was no question but that both were needed.47
One hundred years later, ideas about the importance of sea power never stood
higher in the public realm. All the great powers before 1914 (including land-based
ones such as Russia) strove to have as large a navy as possible, naval “races” occurred between so many of these nations, and Mahan’s theories about the role of
the battle fleet in deciding victory were dominant. What followed in 1914–18, as
described in the section above, was therefore all the more disappointing, and yet
this is understandable if one thinks again about contested “space.” During the war,
sea power was seen by contemporaries to play a lesser role because the Germanled Central Powers had no real opportunity to enter the British Empire’s maritime
space, at least not in the form of surface warfare in the Atlantic and beyond. Grand
Mahanian battle fleets were there, all right, but they were confined by circumstance
to remain chiefly in their North Sea harbors. In the Baltic, North Sea, and Adriatic
waters there were some small, desultory surface actions, but really after 1916 the
struggle for mastery at sea became much more a battle for the Atlantic sea-lanes—
Corbett’s vital maritime routes.
Since extra-European spheres could not be invaded by Berlin except by this
challenge by the U-boat after 1916, and there already existed a gigantic struggle
between the Austro-German and Franco-Russian empires for control of the land
space of Europe, what took place, to the dismay of the navalists, was the dispatch
of huge British Empire and later American armies to swing the land balances on
the western and Italian fronts; the maritime nations were invading continental
space, not the reverse. Significant military operations also took place in Palestine,
Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus during 1915–19, but those were contested only by
Germany’s lesser ally, Turkey, and thus the chief battlefronts remained in Europe,
in France, Italy, and Poland-Ukraine. In none of those areas did sea power play
a direct role. When the year 1918 saw each side committing all their respective
military resources for the hoped-for victory, the Grand Fleet, to Jellicoe’s frustration, swung at anchor in Scapa Flow. Allied naval power had fairly easily preserved
Britain’s own physical security, and then maintained command of the Atlantic sealanes, but those were negative achievements, and ones out of sight, which is why
the role of navies was much less celebrated that it had been in the triumphant years
following 1815.
Even so, the swift collapse of the League of Nations system, the rise of the three
revisionist nations of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the reoccurrence of another
furious worldwide naval arms race in the late 1930s meant that sea power’s role was
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not doubted when the Second World War broke out. The British Admiralty had
no other choice but to rely upon a Mahanian battle posture: off Norway, in sinking
the Bismarck and the Scharnhorst, in protecting the Mediterranean convoys, and in
shepherding the North African and Sicilian landings. At the same time, it had no
other choice but to commit to a massive, unrelenting Corbettian strategy of securing the Atlantic sea-lanes. In the European-Atlantic naval battles, therefore, each
theorist had his vindication.
Further east, the navalists’ case could be much more easily made. The Pacific
War had been from beginning to end about winning or losing maritime mastery.
And if one substituted carrier groups for battleship squadrons, it turned out to be
much more of a Mahanian struggle for command of the central oceans than a Corbettian fight over convoy routes and sea-lanes. It didn’t really matter, though. The
point was that, in this war, naval power had proved to be vital for the Allied victory.
In sum, to every navalist author’s delight, the Pacific War had joined with the
prolonged Atlantic and Mediterranean campaigns in being fought for command
of the sea. And even if Stalinist propaganda was to attempt to ignore the fact, the
war of the eastern front was also affected, in some part, by seaborne supplies to the
USSR and the choking off of such supplies to Germany. Why not then agree that
navies, and naval power, had once again counted for such a lot in world affairs?
That seemed so obvious, when a vast Allied fleet rested in Tokyo Bay, while hundreds of German U-boats were being scuttled or surrendered to their victorious
naval opponents. The end of the First World War was signed in a railway carriage at
Compiègne; but now, the end of the Second World War was signed on the afterdeck
of the battleship USS Missouri. What place of signature, on each occasion, could be
more symbolic? As was the case in 1815, but had not been the case in 1918, Neptune in 1945 could again hold his trident high.
But to what end? Even then, as those victorious Allied navies rested in that bay,
sea power’s role had not really been settled, or, rather, it was about to be unsettled.
Over the post-1945 age there hung the immediate shadow, and the conundrum, of
the coming of atomic weaponry. The claims of all armed services, navies included,
were now thrown into question. This was an odd fate, and an odd ending to a naval
historical narrative that otherwise seemed so teleological; but the fact was that the
story of sea power’s place in the three great global wars of these 150 years simply
did end with such a paradox. The Anglo-American navies that had fought so well,
so impressively, so successfully, came out of this war with their futures more uncertain than ever before in history.
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German Navies from 1848 to 2016

Their Development and Courses from Confrontation
to Cooperation
WERNER RAHN

M

ilitary history deals with the evolution and structure of armed forces
and their position in state and society. In this sense, naval history is
taken to mean that part of military history that concentrates its studies
on the navy. However, when dealing with fields of research, one sphere provides
the greatest challenge for military and naval historians: warfare in the widest sense.1
In his book The Face of Battle, British historian John Keegan points out that
many historians are shy about exploring the profundities and realities of war.2 Generally speaking, we can expect naval or other military historians to have a certain
affinity for the subject of their research. They should have a basic knowledge about
the military, in the same way that we expect an economic historian to have a sound
basic knowledge of economic theory. But Keegan is justified in demanding that
the military historian spend as much time as possible among military personnel,
“because the quite chance observation of trivial incidents may illuminate his . . .
understanding of all sorts of problems from the past which will otherwise almost
certainly remain obscured.”3 Like any historian, the naval historian bears a great
responsibility in his striving after historical truth, if he wants to be taken seriously.
The uncritical patriotic history that used to glorify naval actions should be a thing
of the past.
Today, some historians tend to judge personalities, events, and structures according to today’s moral categories. They end up “putting the past on trial, and
since the critical historian, armed with his generation’s self-confidence or with his
progressive concept of the future, knows everything better, in this trial he will be
prosecutor, judge, and legislator all in one.”4
In 1957, the German navy began to develop a new approach to studying its
own history. That year, the first fleet commander in chief, Rear Adm. Rolf
Johannesson (1900–89), organized the Historical-Tactical Conference. Since then
it has been held every year, and is now a standard element of the naval officer’s
historical education. Johannesson’s aim was to distance his service from subjective
naval history about World War I.5 He hoped that a critical discussion of the past
would teach his officers truth, loyalty, and moral courage, and that they would
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determine their own position more solidly by recourse to history and the federal
constitution. Through 2016, fifty-six conferences have been held, covering a wide
variety of subjects.6 Papers usually are presented by junior officers from the fleet,
assisted by naval historians. The presentation of the papers and the candid discussion of subjects relevant to the business of the day usually provide testimony
to the intellectual talents among the navy’s officer corps. Many an admiral-tobe made a mark when as a lieutenant he presented some critical theory about
history—provoking the older generation’s opposition.
It is a perennial challenge to historians even to come close to historical truth.
The commercial success of popular publications, as well as the large number of
visitors attracted to museums, indicates how many people have historical interests.
Such continuing interest is a stimulating challenge for professional historians. We
should continue to try to present our findings about background information and
structures from the past in such a way that the message gets across—meaning that
historical knowledge and historical sensitivity become factors serving to help stabilize a liberal society.
THE BIRTH OF A GERMAN NAVY
The first German navy worthy to bear such designation was established in 1848,
when a conflict over the duchy of Schleswig resulted in a war with Denmark.7 At
that time, Germany could do nothing against the Danes’ efficient blockade; ocean
trade came to a standstill. This dilemma resulted in a rather emotional movement
that advocated building up a fleet. The issue soon captivated the members of the
national assembly that had convened at Frankfurt’s Saint Paul’s Cathedral only a
short time before. On June 14, 1848, by an overwhelming majority, the first German parliament voted a large appropriation to build a fleet.8
Prince Adalbert of Prussia (1811–73), who had concerned himself with maritime problems rather early, played an important part in those first maritime plans.
In May 1848, he published a memorandum on the buildup of a German fleet
that became, so to speak, the Magna Carta of the German navy. By analyzing the
maritime-strategic situation of Prussia and Germany and having taken into consideration already the imminent technical revolution, it formed the first theoretical
basis for a German naval concept. The memorandum included three models on
which Germany might establish a navy: (1) providing mere coastal defense; (2)
defending sea lines of communication (SLOCs); or (3) building up an independent
sea power. Prince Adalbert, however, clearly emphasized that even steps leading toward the buildup of an independent sea power would involve many risks, and that
once this option had been chosen there could be no stopping halfway.9
During the preparations for the buildup of a fleet, it soon became clear that
almost all requirements—in personnel, matériel, and organization—could not be
met. It was, therefore, only natural to ask for foreign assistance. Arnold Duckwitz
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(1802–81), the first German secretary of the navy, in October 1848 forwarded an
official request to the American government for assistance in building up, with
regard to personnel and matériel, a German fleet. In the United States, the German liberal revolution had been observed with interest and with an open mind.
Thus, the German requests met with a positive response within both private and
official circles. First contacts were established by the frigate USS St. Lawrence,
commanded by Capt. Hiram Paulding (1797–1878), which was visiting Bremerhaven in the fall of 1848. The ship and crew were received enthusiastically
as envoys of a hoped-for ally. The U.S. Navy immediately began personnelsupport activities by rendering assistance with training: the frigate took aboard
four Prussian sea cadets for practical exposure. Captain Paulding, as an adviser,
was for weeks the center of attention during all discussions on the fleet buildup,
which were held in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Hannover. The matériel support concentrated on providing a modern frigate, which was equipped at the New York Naval
Yard and transferred to Europe in the summer of 1849.10
Even though the duration and the scope of this first American military aid to
Germany were limited, that assistance provided early evidence of an American
policy of being ready and able to support, across the Atlantic, the principles of
democracy and liberalism. On both sides of that ocean, common goals and mutual sympathy for the liberal-democratic forces resulted in the first steps toward
cooperation. How close these idealistic ties actually were became evident after the
Frankfurt National Assembly failed, when high emigration rates resulted from disappointed democrats finding their spiritual home in the United States. One example was Carl Schurz (1829–1906), who later became Secretary of the Interior. Such
a “brain drain” strengthened the hand of conservative forces in Germany—the consequences of which are well known.
The German navy remained in existence even after the dream of a united Reich
had long gone and the reality of particularism governed German politics. However,
in 1853 the fleet was disbanded and its few ships were sold or scrapped.11 Only
Prussia, with its relatively longer coastline, still had available a limited number of
naval forces, proudly named the Royal Prussian Navy.
Yet the idea of the navy as an instrument of national unification stayed alive
even after 1848. After the foundation of the Reich in 1871, the navy’s function
as a symbol of German unity was stressed officially, in contrast to the army’s organization by individual states. The very term Imperial Navy emphasized that
this instrument of power was subject directly to the Reich. The personnel of
the Imperial German Navy (IGN) came from all parts of Germany, and the
fleet became, as Tirpitz (see below) once put it, a “melting pot of teutonicism.”12
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However, until 1897 the navy’s development was overshadowed by that of the
army. The navy’s contributions to the wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in
1866, and France in 1870–71 seemingly were of no importance. Strategically, the
IGN concentrated on providing a forward coastal defense.13
STRATEGIC ROOTS OF BUILDING A GERMAN BATTLE FLEET
In 1894, spurred by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), the German naval high command prepared a strategic concept for the buildup of a
battle fleet.14 Capt. Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), then chief of staff of the naval high command, seems to have taken the initiative to formulate the famous
Dienstschrift (Service Memorandum) No. IX, under the misleading title “General
Lessons Learned from the Fleet Autumn Exercise.”15
In this memorandum, Tirpitz resolutely pleads that strategic offensive actions
should be considered “normal tasks of a fleet.”16 Such actions should aim at bringing about “the earliest possible initiation of a battle,” a battle that would reach the
“main decision” of naval warfare. That decision could not be reached by a cruiser war, such as was prescribed under the tenets of the French Jeune École school
of thought, but “only by permanent naval supremacy and lasting pressure on the
enemy.”17
Owing to Germany’s position in the heart of Central Europe, its long coasts on
the North and Baltic Seas, and its borders with eight neighboring nations, any strategy of the Reich that did not rely on strong alliance partners required it to decide
whether a threat should be neutralized defensively or eliminated offensively. As
long as Germany considered only France as a potential enemy (and later Russia as
well), the offensive strategic concept for naval operations that Tirpitz laid down in
Service Memorandum No. IX seemed appropriate.
In June 1897, Tirpitz was appointed state secretary in the Reichsmarineamt (Imperial Naval Office).18 Not least because of his influence, the politics of the Reich
gradually expanded to consider the risks involved in confronting Britain. For Tirpitz, England was, from the beginning, “the most dangerous naval enemy,” against
which Germany “most urgently required a certain measure of naval force as a political power factor.” Since Tirpitz considered cruiser warfare a lost cause, owing to
Germany’s lack of naval bases, he asked for the buildup of a fleet that “can unfold its
greatest military potential between Heligoland and the Thames.”19
Elsewhere within the IGN there were well-founded doubts regarding this conceptualization. Capt. Curt Freiherr von Maltzahn (1849–1930), who at that time
taught tactics and naval history at the German naval academy, warned as early as
1898 that reaching “Seeherrschaft” (sea control) by means of a battle would not suffice by itself to impose peace on the opponent, for such sea control would have to
be maintained and exploited. This would require a surplus of strength. As long as
neither party achieved sea control, the weaker party would be confined to fighting
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against the achievement of sea control by its enemy, forgoing victory as the goal
of its own combat actions. It would be important to maintain a national seaborne
trade “corresponding in strength to the means deployed for defense.”20 Maltzahn
considered a combination of squadron operations and cruiser war to be the most
suitable naval strategy. “Squadron operations are indispensable in this type of warfare, but they are only a means and not an end, and they become only really valuable if the freedom of action thus gained is exploited.”21
However, such a foresighted and realistic alternative, one that combined a balanced defensive fleet with strong cruiser elements, stood no chance in the IGN.
Tirpitz repressed any further strategic discussions so as not to jeopardize the buildup of the fleet, which had received legislative backing and thereafter was scheduled
to be accomplished over an extended period.22
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: THE NAVAL ARMAMENT RACE
The objectives and planning principles of the German battle fleet construction
can be summarized as follows: The basic prerequisite for gaining sea control was
the destruction, or at least the decisive weakening, of the enemy battle fleet. Thus,
planning focused on the fleet’s capability to impose a decision in battle. The battle
fleet also was considered a political means of power that could enable Germany to
defend its overseas interests adequately. Britain, the most dangerous potential opponent, was to be deterred from a war with Germany by means of a strong fleet, or,
should deterrence fail, was to be engaged successfully.
Among the liberal bourgeoisie, the naval policy met with strong support, which
was increased even further by propaganda skillfully directed. However, while
drawing up its ambitious armament program, Germany misjudged the dangers
arising from its geographical situation in Central Europe. Any German approach
that strove to establish an international maritime stature and adopt a counterpoint
stance toward Britain was bound to be met with profound suspicion from Britain. After the German-British alliance talks in 1901 failed to produce any tangible
results—the two sides were pursuing incompatible objectives—the buildup of the
German battle fleet became and remained a crucial disruptive factor, preventing
any subsequent arrangement with Britain and resulting in an arms race.
From 1905 onward, that escalatory dynamic was characterized by an enormous
increase in the combat power of battleships. With the construction of HMS Dreadnought in 1905–1906, the Royal Navy set a new standard. Tirpitz had to keep pace
if the IGN was to remain equal, ship for ship, with its potential enemy. As a result,
his long-term financial planning had been in vain, for the construction of capital
ships involved ever-increasing costs.
Britain could cope with the cost increases involved in the construction of capital
ships, or at least it had to do so since its security was exclusively dependent on the
superiority of the Royal Navy. In contrast, the defense of Germany was primarily
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an army responsibility, with the navy playing a secondary role. Britain’s first lord
of the Admiralty Winston Churchill (1874–1965) explained this in a public speech
in February 1912. The strategic situations of both countries, Churchill pointed out,
made his own fleet a vital necessity to the British Empire, whereas “from some
points of view, the German Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury.”23
Groaning under the burden of high naval expenditures, in 1912 both governments tried again to come to an agreement that they hoped would reduce the building rates of capital ships. In February 1912, the British cabinet sent Secretary of
State for War Richard B. Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane (1856–1928), to Berlin to
try to reach a general settlement in these matters. However, Lord Haldane’s talks
with the German side never converted into real negotiations, and the effort failed
after a few days. The British were unwilling “to commit themselves to neutrality,”
and the German side—under pressure from Tirpitz—was unwilling to modify the
country’s planned building rate.24 Tirpitz appreciated that for England “the Entente
with France gives her the best security against a too powerful Germany,” he said.
“I no longer believe that we can get out of this vicious circle.”25 As Germany did
not have enough resources to fulfill all the requirements of both the army and the
navy, the IGN could not keep up in the unconstrained arms race that commenced
thereafter, even though by 1914 it had become the world’s second-strongest navy.
Before 1914, modern warships, such as capital ships, cruisers, and torpedo
boats, were not only part of a nation’s military potential but striking evidence of
its industrial and technological capability. Only highly industrialized nations could
solve on their own the complex technological problems that the transition to modern capital ships involved. This was particularly true for the new technologies of
engines and weapons, as well as for the improvement in ship survivability achieved
through the use of high-quality steel armor.26
The period between 1905 and 1914 was characterized by a technological revolution that made naval weapons obsolete rapidly. This applied to cruisers, torpedo
boats, and submarines as well as larger units. During the first major naval battles
of World War I, the decisive effects of superior speed and more-powerful guns
became apparent.
STRATEGY AND GEOGRAPHY
Tirpitz based his strategic concept on the assumption that the Royal Navy always would act offensively in a war against Germany; in particular, it would establish a close blockade of the German coast. Such a blockade near Heligoland
“would provide abundant opportunities to equalize naval strength” or to “enter
into a decisive battle.”27 For the IGN, this hypothetical battle became an element of
dogma—the focal point of its operational concept and fleet training. For this reason, knowledge of and experience with weapons technology, tactics, and shiphandling were more-decisive factors in the careers of naval officers than qualification
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in staff assignments—which had a long-term effect on the choice of personnel for
command-and-control appointments. The work of the Admiralstab (naval staff),
established in 1899, and the creation of a specialized corps of staff officers to man
it, seemed secondary in importance. As a consequence, the naval officer corps remained unprepared for the complex strategic dimensions of a naval war against
Britain.28
Although all the preparations focused on the “decisive battle,” a great deal of
confusion existed regarding the true purpose of the battle.29 While those staffing
the German naval command had adopted Mahan’s theory of sea power willingly,
they paid only lip service to a central element of that theory: the importance of
geographical position and the resultant strategic options. By throttling Germany’s
seaborne trade, an opponent could decide a “war by severing an artery essential to
the existence of Germany.”30
An incorrect assessment of the effects of geography on British naval operations
led the German naval leadership to a faulty assessment of British strategy. Britain
had never attempted to eliminate an opponent’s navy at any price; it did so only
when the British Isles and their SLOCs in the Atlantic were threatened. And these
SLOCs remained outside the range of the German naval forces, except for a few
cruisers and, later, submarines. To maintain a close blockade of the German coast,
the Royal Navy would have found it useful to eliminate the German fleet at an
early date, but the Admiralty was well aware that such a strategic offensive would
involve considerable losses. Especially cognizant of the threat that German torpedo
boats, submarines, and mines represented, after 1911–12 the Royal Navy no longer
considered deploying its Grand Fleet to the southern North Sea.31 In November
1912, the Admiralty issued a set of “General Instructions” to its war plans against
Germany, summarizing Britain’s strategic approach as follows:
The general idea is to use our geographical advantage of position to cut off all German shipping from oceanic trade and to secure the British coasts from any serious military enterprise
and incidentally but effectually to cover the transport across the Channel of an Expeditionary Force to France. . . . It is believed that the prolongation of a distant blockade will inflict
injury upon German interests. . . . To relieve such a situation, Germany would be tempted
to send into the North Sea a force sufficient . . . to offer a general action. Such an action or
actions would take place far from the German coast and close to our own.32

This plan implied a new wartime deployment for the Grand Fleet: basing it at Scapa
Flow, in the Scottish Orkneys.
When in 1912 the German naval staff discovered the new orientation of its potential enemy, the chief of naval staff, Vice Adm. August von Heeringen (1855–
1927), examined in a war game whether and how Germany’s High Seas Fleet
could counter a distant blockade. The result was sobering. The Blue (i.e., German)
wargaming party had advanced its squadrons as far as the Firth of Forth, but there
they encountered difficulties and suffered considerable losses while withdrawing.
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The admiral concluded: “If the British really restrict their activities to the remote
blockade and consistently hold back their battle fleet, then the role of our beautiful
High Seas Fleet could be a very sad one in wartime. The submarines will have to
do the job.”33
It must be left open what type of submarine employment Heeringen had in
mind, but his estimate hit the central strategic problem for German naval warfare
during World War I. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the role of the submarine as a naval weapon “had grown from base to coast
defence and from this to an offensive task in enemy waters.”34 Basically, the submarine was a mobile torpedo boat with long endurance. Submerged, a submarine
made only slow progress—but it had the ability to vanish below the surface of the
sea for several hours.
In comparison with other naval powers, the IGN came late to building submarines. The first one, U-1 (282 tons), was commissioned in December 1906. Obviously, Tirpitz had waited until he was sure that submarines were an effective offensive weapon. After 1908, he ordered more than forty oceangoing submarines, of
which twenty-eight had been completed before war broke out.35
WORLD WAR I
When Britain joined the war on the side of France and Russia in August 1914, it
became clear that the German High Seas Fleet could not perform its political function of deterrence. Britain, relying on its superior fleet and the strategic positions
the country and its empire held worldwide to protect its vital SLOCs, considered
the German fleet, which could operate only from the North Sea, to be an acceptable risk.36
In August 1914, the IGN lay under the spell of great enemy superiority. The naval command placed all its hopes on reducing enemy forces through offensive submarine and minelaying operations. The assumption was that the opponent would
seek battle, but Germany’s fleet was to be employed in such a battle only “under
favorable conditions.”37
Although the few German cruisers stationed overseas at the outbreak of war
were quite successful in guerre de course (warfare against merchant vessels), the
Royal Navy soon neutralized them. Germany’s East Asiatic Squadron, under Vice
Adm. Maximilian von Spee (1861–1914) moved across the Pacific Ocean and destroyed a British squadron off Chile, but its advance to the Falkland Islands in the
South Atlantic on December 8, 1914, proved fatal.38 The example demonstrates that
the IGN neither recognized nor made use of the strategic advantages it might have
derived from coordinating the operations of its naval forces overseas with those at
home.
However, one small but powerful German squadron did influence the balance of forces and the overall course of World War I: the Mediterranean Division,

GERMAN NAVIES FROM 1848 TO 2016

comprising the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau, under Rear Adm.
Wilhelm A. Souchon (1864–1946). The breakthrough of the two units to Constantinople and their formal handover to Turkey in August 1914 influenced Turkey to
join the war on the side of the Central powers in October 1914. The Turkish straits
(the Dardanelles and the Bosporus) became impassable for the Allies; all their attempts to penetrate them failed, with heavy losses.39 Thus, the second important
route to Russia, other than the Baltic Sea, remained blocked, contributing to Russia’s loss as an ally of the Entente in 1917. After the war, Sir Julian S. Corbett commented as follows on this German strategic success:
When we consider that the Dardanelles was mined, that no permission to enter it had been
ratified, and that everything depended on the German powers of cajolery at Constantinople,
when we also recall the world wide results that ensued, it is not too much to say that few
naval decisions more bold and well-judged were ever taken. So completely, indeed, did the
risky venture turn a desperate situation into one of high moral and material advantage, that
for the credit of German statesmanship it goes far to balance the cardinal blunder of attacking France through Belgium.40

The various operations the High Seas Fleet conducted in the North and Baltic
Seas, which culminated in the battle of Jutland in May 1916, cannot conceal the
fact that primarily it performed the functions of a “fleet in being”: securing the
German coast, blocking the Baltic approaches, and keeping clear the submarines’
sailing routes.41
In the first few months of the war, the submarine gave a striking demonstration
of its power. On September 22, 1914, U-9 (Lt. Otto Weddigen [1880–1915], commanding) sank three aged armored cruisers in an hour. At first, the Royal Navy
could not believe the cruisers “had been attacked by a single submarine and attributed the disaster to a whole flotilla.”42 Over the next couple of weeks, the U-boats
extended their patrols; by October 1914, U-20 had penetrated the Channel to attack
transports on their way to France, circumnavigated the British Isles, and returned
to Germany, having cruised 2,200 miles in eighteen days.43
Commerce Raiding by U-boats, 1915–18
The varied arguments concerning the degree of success German submarines
achieved in their raiding against Britain’s maritime commerce are a classic example
of the civil-military struggle of a nation at war. At the time, this struggle was influenced greatly by public opinion, for submarine warfare became a popular myth to
which a large number of Germans subscribed; they believed the U-boat was some
sort of infallible, magic weapon that would bring victory. Because of some successful surprise raids, not only the public but the naval command overestimated the
efficiency of submarines.
Initial considerations within the IGN regarding the employment of submarines against British shipping had not yielded a clear picture by the time Tirpitz
spoke publicly on the issue—which he did without consulting Chancellor Theobald
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von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856–1921) or chief of naval staff Adm. Hugo von Pohl
(1855–1916). In response to the British threat to “strangulate the [German] economy with the help of a blockade,” as Churchill had put it in a speech on November 9,
Tirpitz responded in an interview that Germany could “play the same game”—by
torpedoing all British shipping.44
This triggered a passionate public debate that had repercussions for the naval
command. The young historian Gerhard Ritter (1888–1967) knew from his own
experience during the war that
[i]t was Tirpitz’s interview that poured more oil on the fire when it was published in late
December. Thenceforth the question of submarine warfare was no longer a naval problem
for the experts to judge, but a political issue of the first order, with everyone having his say.
A “U-boat movement” quickly came into being. . . . Again the academic superpatriots were
in the forefront with plans and petitions to the Chancellor and the navy on how to starve
Britain into submission. Some of the most renowned names at the University of Berlin were
among them.45

The naval staff encouraged support for commerce warfare from the government; however, the method’s prospects for success could not be assessed, because
so few submarines were available. Of the twenty-two submarines in the North Sea
in early 1915, only fourteen (those with diesel engines) could operate west of the
British Isles. The chancellor came under both public and naval pressure while making his decision, and he relied too much on the navy staff ’s optimistic forecast.
Early in February 1915, Bethmann-Hollweg gave his consent to submarine warfare—without either the government or the naval command having analyzed thoroughly the methodology of commerce raiding itself or the associated political risks
and international complications.
The German proclamation of February 4, 1915, declared “the waters around
Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, to be a war
zone in which every merchant ship encountered would be destroyed, without it
always being possible to assure the safety of passengers and crew. Because of the
British misuse of neutral flags, it might not always be possible to prevent attacks
meant for hostile ships from falling on neutrals.”46 By conducting commerce warfare in this way, Germany opened new issues in international law, because submarines could not adhere adequately to the classic prize rules. This was particularly so
after the British began arming merchant vessels, and later created disguised British
auxiliary cruisers (Q-ships), which were a great threat to U-boats.
Despite these challenges, the commanding officers of German submarines, displaying a combination of caution and skill, achieved remarkable results with their
deck guns while managing to comply with the prize regulations. Owing to a lack
of space, submarines could not embark survivors, but in many cases they towed
lifeboats to nearby coasts. However, the German naval staff criticized this practice:
“The deterring effect of the submarine war will be lost if it is felt that passing the
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blockade zone is no longer a serious risk to the lives of the crews.”47 Without providing its submarine commanding officers with clear instructions, the naval command
obviously assumed that most ships would be sunk by torpedoes without warning,
further deterring neutral shipping.
When the U.S. government raised concerns about the way the war was being
waged and referred to the international principles of naval warfare, the chief of the
general staff, Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922), feared the United States
might enter the war. He wanted a guarantee that submarine warfare would force
England “to give in” within six weeks. When the kaiser inquired about the matter,
Tirpitz and the new chief of naval staff, Vice Adm. Gustav Bachmann (1860–1943),
confirmed this amazing forecast—without explaining what they meant by England’s
“giving in.” On February 12, Bachmann wrote to Admiral Pohl, then commander in
chief of the High Seas Fleet: “It is in the military interest to make submarine warfare as effective as possible. Do not shy away from sinking enemy passenger liners.
Their loss will cause the greatest impact.”48
The first serious instances of confrontation with the United States arose from
German naval activities. On May 7, 1915, the submarine U-20 sank the British
passenger liner Lusitania (31,550 gross registered tons [GRT]), using only one torpedo. This attack was conducted without warning and claimed the lives of 1,198
civilians, including 126 Americans; however, it was established later that Lusitania
had been carrying some war matériel in its forecastle.
This incident caused a severe diplomatic rift with the United States. President
Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) called on Germany to adhere to the accepted principles of naval warfare and to respect the safety of American citizens traveling in
the war zone. Following a similar incident in August 1915, the German government yielded. In September, over the objection of the naval command, commerce
raiding was ordered stopped west of the British Isles; only in the North and Mediterranean Seas was commerce raiding continued, and then in accordance with the
prize regulations.
By early 1916, the number of operational U-boats had risen to fifty-one. Intensified submarine warfare, as demanded by the chief of general staff, resumed in
February 1916. It aimed at sinking armed British merchant vessels, without warning, while sparing passenger liners. But the French Channel steamer Sussex was
torpedoed on March 24, 1916, and another severe crisis between Germany and the
United States ensued. On April 18, 1916, Washington threatened to sever diplomatic relations.49
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg now saw his earlier pessimistic assessment of
the situation confirmed. From the onset of the new stage of submarine warfare, he
had doubted the need for such a hazardous venture, “which would claim as a stake
our existence as a great power and the future of our nation in its entirety, while the
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chance of winning, that is, the prospect of bringing England down by fall, is a rather
uncertain one.”50
So the chancellor provided assurance to Washington that merchant vessels
“would not be sunk without warning or without saving people’s lives.”51 As a result,
the frontline commanders of the IGN (i.e., of the High Seas Fleet and the German
marine corps in Flanders), acting on their own initiative—later backed up by the
naval command—moved their submarines out of the western operating areas because they felt that operating under prize regulations exposed their vessels to great
danger. Commerce raiding under the prize regulations was continued only in the
Mediterranean. In the North Sea, the submarines operated against military targets
until September 1916, without achieving any significant results.
This extreme reaction—transferring submarines out of the operating areas
entirely—was inconsistent with the actual situation. Of the thirty-five submarines
that had been lost by June 1916, only four had been destroyed by Q-ships, and none
had been destroyed by armed merchant vessels.
Submarines’ promising capabilities for commerce raiding, even under the prize
regulations, became more discernible in summer 1916.52 The resumption of submarine warfare under the prize regulations provoked no political risks while achieving
considerable results: the monthly average of sinkings between October 1916 and
January 1917 was 189 merchant vessels, of 324,742 GRT. This was not enough to
force a decision in the war against Britain, but the war economy of the Allies was
damaged heavily enough to produce a chance for a negotiated peace. Still, the naval
command, in a rigid and dogmatic manner, repeatedly demanded “unrestricted
submarine warfare.” The IGN was convinced that this would result in decisive victory, even presuming the expected break with the United States.
The naval staff decided to test the U.S. government by sending a submarine to
the U.S. East Coast. On October 7, 1916, thirty-one-year-old Lt. Hans Rose (1885–
1969), endowed with powers equivalent to those of an ancient Roman proconsul
(his wording), headed his submarine, U-53, for Newport, Rhode Island, as a demonstration of the efficiency of German submarines—and as a warning to the U.S.
Navy. After a three-hour visit to the Naval War College, Rose departed Newport—
and sank five enemy merchant ships off the American coast, under prize rules.
Sixteen U.S. destroyers observed this action at close range.53
The atmosphere and attitude among German naval officers at that time were
portrayed in a diary entry by Lt. Ernst von Weizsäcker (1882–1951) of September
27, 1916. “The naval officers are sitting around, drinking, talking politics, hatching
plots, and into the bargain feel patriotic, trying, in a dishonest way, to force submarine warfare. Submarine warfare is designed to conceal the foolish things done in
developing the fleet and employing the fleet in war. This inadmissible propaganda
evidences their bad consciences.”54
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However, the propaganda Weizsäcker mentioned was effective. This was especially significant since the new general headquarters of all army forces, under Field
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) and Gen. Erich Ludendorff (1865–
1937), realized that the attrition campaign had failed and that, as things stood,
victory in France was becoming less and less likely.
Unlike the military, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg intended to avoid U.S. entry into the war on the Allied side. He hoped that President Wilson would arrange a
negotiated peace. However, when the British government in December 1916 harshly rejected a German peace offer, German leaders changed their opinion. Now the
military leaders, especially Hindenburg and Ludendorff, categorically demanded
“unrestricted submarine warfare,” claiming it was the last means of gaining victory.
At a conference on January 9, 1917, after heated discussion, the chancellor supported their demand, and the German high command recommenced unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917.55 A few weeks later, at a meeting of the Main
Parliament Committee, Adm. Eduard von Capelle (1855–1931), Tirpitz’s successor,
“went so far as to insist that the effect of American entry into war would be ‘zero’!
American troops would not even be able to cross the ocean for lack of transport.”56
In response to unrestricted warfare, the United States broke relations with Germany, announcing “armed neutrality.” However, the Entente wanted the United
States to enter the war, so the alliance could take utmost advantage of a fully mobilized American war economy. Thanks to maladroit German diplomacy, this goal
soon was accomplished.
Seeking to keep the Americans militarily engaged on their continent and in
the Pacific Ocean, Germany proposed an alliance with Japan and Mexico. The
proposal was sent by cable to Mexico in the so-called Zimmermann telegram
on January 16, 1917. With the aid of captured German codebooks, British naval
intelligence managed to decrypt all the German diplomatic cables transmitted
among Berlin, Washington, and Mexico City. To expedite the U.S. decision-making
process, the British government transmitted the pertinent cables to Washington,
and President Wilson had them released to the press on February 28.57
Germany’s offer to Mexico of an alliance inflamed American public opinion
against Germany. Early in April, the United States entered the war on the side of
the Allies. Thus, unrestricted submarine warfare alone did not trigger the American declaration of war, but Germany’s naval stance contributed to it in a substantial
way.
On February 1, 1917, Germany had 105 operational submarines available to
conduct unrestricted submarine warfare. By June 1917, their number had been increased to only 129. Because of the increase in operations between February and
July 1917, repair periods gradually were prolonged, leading to a decrease in the
number of operationally ready submarines.58
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On the other hand, in April 1917 alone, 458 Allied ships totaling 840,000 GRT
were sunk. This led to a severe crisis for the Allies, who momentarily doubted their
ability to continue the war. However, Germany did not achieve its strategic objective—effective disruption of British shipping. The Allies introduced convoying in
the summer of 1917, and thereafter far fewer ships were sunk. Between February and June 1917, an average of 363 ships of 629,863 GRT were sunk per month,
whereas during the last quarter of 1917 sinkings averaged 159 per month, totaling
365,489 GRT. In 1918, the numbers of ships sunk decreased even further. Because
German Submarine Losses 1914–18
Cause

1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

Total

2

1

—

8

3

14

—

2

2

4

Ramming
• By warships
• By merchant vessels
Artillery
• By warships

—

2

3

—

3

8

• By merchant vessels

—

—

—

—

1

1

• By Q-ships

—

3

2

6

—

11

Searching gear with petard

—

1

1

—

1

3

Explosion of ammunition aboard a
merchant vessel

—

—

—

1

—

1

Attack by aircraft

—

—

—

1

—

1

Depth charges

—

—

2

7

21

30

Torpedoing

—

4

1

7

6

18

Mines

2

2

6

21

23

54

• By German mines

—

2

1

6

1

10

• By German torpedoes

—

1

—

—

1

2

• By beaching

—

1

2

2

—

5

• During diving

—

—

—

1

—

1

• Collision with German submarine

—

—

—

1

—

1

Unknown

1

2

4

—

7

14

Total

5

19

22

63

69

178

Accidents

Note: Excludes accidents in home waters.
Sources: Robert M. Grant, U-boats Destroyed: The Effect of Anti-submarine Warfare 1914–1918 (London: Putnam, 1964); Robert
M. Grant, U-boat Intelligence (London: Putnam, 1969). Cf. Joachim Schröder, Die U-Boote des Kaisers: Die Geschichte des deutschen
U-Boot-Krieges gegen Großbritannien im Ersten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2003), and Rahn, “Die Kaiserliche Marine und der
Erste Weltkrieg,” p. 72.

GERMAN NAVIES FROM 1848 TO 2016

of this, the German naval staff was not able to keep the promise it had made: by the
autumn of 1918, about 1.4 million American soldiers had made it to France. U.S.
entry into the war proved to be the decisive factor in the defeat of Germany.59
After the Allies introduced the convoy system, German submarines faced serious operational and tactical problems. The concentration of merchant ships in a
convoy had to be countered with a concentration of submarines. Even before that,
reconnaissance was required—the convoys had to be detected. The few boats available west of the British Isles could not cover the entire operating area, allowing
many convoys to reach Britain undetected. When a submarine sighted a convoy,
it could conduct a submerged attack, with torpedoes. The gun armament, which
until the institution of convoying had achieved most results, fell into disuse.
Along with introducing the convoy system, the Allies enhanced antisubmarine
defense by developing more efficient depth charges and the first underwater locating devices. But above all, it was the intensive mining of the shipping lanes in the
North Sea and the English Channel that caused most U-boat casualties. Of the 132
German submarines lost in 1917–18, at least fifty sank after hitting mines.60
At the end of September 1918, the army’s supreme command admitted military
defeat and demanded an immediate armistice. The United States made termination of unrestricted submarine warfare a precondition for reestablishing diplomatic contact. Yet the German naval command—to justify its existence—prepared
to send the fleet out for one final battle. The ships’ companies discerned that the
naval command was acting arbitrarily and refused to obey. Within a few days, this
mutiny developed into a revolt that led to the collapse and end of the IGN, which
accelerated a general uprising in Germany.61
The Lessons of the Great War
In spite of outstanding achievements and successes against a superior opponent
in various war theaters, the outcome of German naval operations was negative at
the end of World War I. Not only did the IGN’s strategic concepts for fleet employment and for commerce warfare using submarines fail, but those failures were
the starting point for a revolt that triggered the political overthrow of the government. Nevertheless, the High Seas Fleet effectively operated as a fleet in being. Its
presence pinned down the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea, including lighter
naval forces, which consequently were not available for convoy-escort duty in the
Atlantic. The fleet protected the German coast, blocked the Baltic against Allied resupply shipments to Russia, and, to a certain extent, backed up submarine warfare
by keeping the departure and return routes clear. Contrary to the current view of
historians who entirely deny the fleet’s strategic importance, the fleet was an asset
for the German war effort; but a realistic cost-benefit analysis shows that, in the
end, the fleet did not achieve what it was expected to.
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One of the fundamental lessons learned during World War I was that, over the
long run, an effective blockade could so weaken the German war potential and
economy, which were greatly dependent on the importation of raw materials, that
not even defensive operations could be conducted. The German naval command
had not realized that sea power, i.e., the ability to control and successfully use the
sea, essentially is the product of both fleet strength and geographical position. If
either factor were deficient, the entire result suffered. This was one of the essential
reasons the High Seas Fleet did not bring about a decision in the overall conduct of
the war. It failed to develop a concept in which the two components of naval warfare—surface forces and submarines—were integrated to enable timely and effective
deployment against the two key strategic weak points in the enemy alliance: Allied
merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Russian coastline in the Baltic.
During the submarine war against Allied merchant shipping, the naval command rigidly relied on a one-sided and, in the end, inadequate naval concept that
ignored the possibility and reality of U.S. entry into the war, thereby contributing
to Germany’s defeat. During the operations against Russia, Germany hardly ever
exploited its naval superiority. However, Germany’s blocking of access to the Baltic, in parallel with its ally’s control of the Turkish straits, diminished Russia’s war
potential considerably. This success in the economic war, which Germany had not
foreseen, relieved the country of the necessity to prosecute the war on two fronts
by the spring of 1918; but that was too late to bring about success for the overall
war effort.
The result Germany experienced in World War I was due not only to insufficient concepts and means but to the naval command’s strategic incompetence.
The leadership seemed to be incapable of recognizing the natural limits that
existed—limits that would have to be imposed on any German naval strategy within the overall strategic concept.
THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1919–39
The Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany to the status of a third-rate naval power.62
Submarines and military aircraft were forbidden to it altogether. As a result, the
navy lacked the weapons that modern naval warfare required. However, French
opposition thwarted the British attempt to abolish the submarine entirely; Paris
became the champion of minor naval powers by emphasizing the importance of the
submarine as a naval weapon for weaker nations.63 During the preparation of the
peace treaty, Adm. William S. Benson (1855–1932), the American Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), advocated only moderate cuts in the strength of the future German navy so as to maintain a counterbalance to the British fleet in the North Sea.64
The British never considered taking over the German ships for their own fleet—
too costly; they simply wanted to sink them. However, France and Italy dismissed
this idea. The problem was solved when the Germans themselves sank the major
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part of their fleet at Scapa Flow on June 21, 1919.65 The German naval command
regarded this accomplishment primarily as a moral success. The consequences of
the scuttling were severe: the Allies demanded full compensation, and claimed 80
percent of all German port equipment; and the navy had to surrender its last five
modern light cruisers.
German naval forces came to seem superfluous, given the total military defeat
of 1918, the domestic unrest of 1919, and the ongoing border conflicts with Poland. However, for the navy to continue in existence and preserve its independence
from the army, the service required a plausible long-run mission. When, during
the peace negotiations in the spring of 1919, the German government offered to
renounce its force of six old battleships so as to achieve concessions in other areas,
the victorious powers refused, pointing out that Germany should retain some limited naval forces for its own protection. They projected a small German fleet as a
stabilizing factor in the Baltic area. Thus, Germany’s former enemies contributed
considerably to the continued existence—modest as it was—of the German navy.66
The naval command argued that a navy was necessary because of the territorial
changes in eastern Europe, referring primarily to the alterations to Poland’s borders
and the resultant isolation of East Prussia. In 1919–21, a Polish-Russian border
dispute led to war, and future border conflicts could not be ruled out.67 If Germany
had no naval forces at all, it would be impossible to defend East Prussia; the Poles
would be able to cut the sea route across the Baltic—the only reliable line of supply
for the German enclave.
The navy’s deliberations, unlike those of the army, soon expanded to consider
other possible conflicts. As early as 1922 they took into account Poland’s ties with
France. Once again, German naval strategy focused its attention on the North Sea.
Given the German economy’s great dependence on seaborne supplies, the prerequisites for conducting defensive operations could be achieved only if German shipping in the North and Baltic Seas continued unhindered.
The navy considered itself to be an instrument of territorial defense against
France and Poland, while hoping, in better times to come, for an end to armament
restrictions. When it became apparent that the limitations on their own arms that
the victorious powers had announced at Versailles were not going to materialize,
the German government consistently aspired to equal rights and national sovereignty in the military sphere, such that it could develop the country’s armed forces
into an effective instrument of national defense.
In terms of matériel, a new start gradually was made, by constructing some
torpedo boats and light cruisers. However, the challenge of developing a tenthousand-ton armored vessel (permitted by the peace treaty) that had sufficient
combat power to survive an engagement with French capital ships was a tough nut
to crack. Given the displacement limitation, it was not possible to meet normal
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requirements for armament and armor plating. When the changes in the armament
limitations for which the naval command had hoped failed to materialize, the navy
was forced to concentrate on designing a ship that was more like a cruiser than a
battleship.
The decisive elements that influenced this change in planning lay on
two levels, the tactical-operational and the political-military. In the tacticaloperational sphere, exercises showed that heavy naval forces needed more speed. In
the political-military sphere, the naval command thought it imperative that every
German ship constructed be superior in at least one respect to the warship categories defined in the Washington Naval Agreement (encompassing multiple treaties)
of 1922. For battleships, it sought speed; for cruisers, heavy guns. To replace the
old battleships while remaining under the terms of the peace treaty, the naval command planned a ship carrying six twenty-eight-centimeter (cm) guns and capable
of twenty-eight knots.
To understand the German line of reasoning, it is necessary to look at the status
of international naval armaments at the end of the 1920s. The countries that had
signed the Washington Naval Treaty (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United
States) had navies dominated by capital ships having eight to twelve heavy guns
(with calibers between 30.5 and 40.6 cm) and speeds of twenty to twenty-three
knots. Only Britain and Japan had battle cruisers equipped with six to eight heavy
guns. These had a top speed between twenty-seven and thirty-one knots. Until
1930, the Washington Naval Treaty limited the total tonnage and construction of
battleships and aircraft carriers. For cruisers, the treaty established ceilings only for
the displacement and armament of individual vessels. Thus, cruisers with a standard displacement of ten thousand tons and light armor were built. Their main
armament comprised six to ten 20.3 cm guns; they had a top speed of thirty-three
knots. Although they could evade the slower capital ships, they had to avoid contact with battle cruisers, which were capable of similar speed yet far superior in
armament.
Since the core of the French fleet consisted of nine slow capital ships and five
fast heavy cruisers, the German naval command deliberately endowed its tenthousand-ton vessel with the characteristics of a “small battle-cruiser”: it was superior to cruisers in armament and to capital ships in speed. With six 28 cm guns in
two triple turrets and a speed of twenty-six to twenty-eight knots, the Panzerschiff
(armored ship, also known as a “pocket battleship”) came very close to the concept of the battle cruiser. Moreover, diesel engines would give the ship a maximum
range of twenty thousand miles, vastly exceeding that of any cruiser or capital ship.
Owing to its combat effectiveness and endurance, the pocket battleship was suitable for both warfare in the North Sea and offensive operations in the Atlantic.
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The construction of the ship immediately attracted the attention of foreign naval experts. In April 1929, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold
(1869–1941), reported to his government as follows:
From a naval technical point of view, the building of this vessel is to be welcomed, as its design promises to include a number of new features in warship construction. The principal of
these are reported to be a comparatively heavy armament of six 11-inch guns, eight 5.8-inch
and twenty antiaircraft guns, six torpedo tubes, adequate armour protection, special Diesel
engines giving a cruising speed of 26 knots, the extensive employment of light metals and
electric welding in place of riveting, and the highest degree of unsinkability.68

However, Germany’s naval command regarded the construction of pocket battleships not just as a military necessity but as a political-military lever with which
to upset the entire system of international naval armament controls that had been
established—without German participation—at Washington in 1922. The naval
command hoped this step would give Germany the chance to be readmitted to the
community of major naval powers.69 Of course, if Germany had been included in
the Washington Naval Agreement, this would have been tantamount to a wholesale
abrogation of the naval arms limitations laid down in the Treaty of Versailles.
Change of Strategy and Operational Planning
The naval command was cognizant that Germany was highly dependent on seaborne imports. It tried to impress this overall strategic reality on the army so the
latter would take that factor into account when drawing up its operational plans.
From 1928 onward, the new minister of the Reichswehr (German Imperial Defense), Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Groener (Ret.) (1867–1939), set new standards for all
operational planning by the army and navy. He stressed that the idea of a largescale war had to be ruled out from the start. Military operations against foreign
powers should be limited to two possible types of conflict: (1) repelling raids from
neighboring states onto German territory; (2) maintaining armed neutrality during
a conflict between foreign powers.
Groener demanded that the Reichswehr be combat ready to oppose immediately any sudden Polish invasion. For the navy, this new concept meant it had to be
able, on seventy-two hours’ notice, to begin operations to destroy the Polish navy
and neutralize the port of Gdynia as a naval base.70 Such a demonstrative strike
clearly was intended to be part of a strategy of deterrence. Under this concept of
calculated escalation, the German government could react quickly to a possible
invasion, then refer the conflict to the League of Nations without delay. Thus, the
government gave the navy, for the first time, a role as an effective instrument of
crisis management.
In the spring of 1929, Groener requested that the naval command review
whether Germany, to conduct its maritime defense, would need any surface units
that went beyond the ceiling of the peace treaty. By so inquiring, Groener got at
the heart of the self-perception of the navy’s leadership, which saw its service not

71

72

THE HATTENDORF PRIZE LECTURES, VOLUME 1

merely as an instrument of national defense but, in the long run, as an indispensable prerequisite for a future German maritime position of power. Under no circumstances would a return to brown-water-navy status be acceptable; the German
navy instead intended to build oceangoing units, in accordance with the traditional
concept of naval prestige, and thereby to express hope for a better future. Naturally,
it was not possible, nor was it intended, to explain this to a minister who, although
he had pushed the Panzerschiff through the Reichstag (national legislature), otherwise had expressed often his critical attitude toward the buildup of the German
High Seas Fleet before 1914.
In his reply to Groener’s question, “Does Germany need large warships?,” the
chief of naval command, Adm. Erich Raeder (1876–1960), championed the earlier
naval concept, which focused on a potential conflict with France and Poland.71 He
argued that the attitude of the navy must not be determined by wishful thinking
to reestablish itself as a major naval power. Its most important task in war was to
prevent—at all costs—enemy forces from interdicting German SLOCs. World War
I had proved the connection between German resistance at the home front and naval blockade: “Cutting off our sea lanes is the simplest and safest way, without any
bloodshed, of defeating us. Our enemies know this as well. England has the most
powerful fleet world-wide and its geographical position is disastrous for Germany.
Therefore, any armed conflict has to be avoided that would turn England into one
of our enemies. We would be doomed to failure right from the start.”72
Raeder’s memorandum concluded that the navy—without even considering the
limits the peace treaty set—could fight the fleet only of a second-class sea power,
such as France.
Naval Rearmament under Hitler, 1933–37
A few days after seizing power in January 1933, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) made
it clear to naval and other military commanders that he intended to develop the
armed forces into an instrument of his power politics. As far as the translation of
this objective into armament was concerned, Hitler was initially cautious. As he
explained in a speech on February 3, 1933: “The most dangerous period is that of
rearmament. Then we shall see whether France has statesmen. If she does, she will
not grant us time but will jump on us (presumably with eastern satellites).”73
The Reichsmarine (German Navy) had to make do with compromises regarding
the displacement and armament of its future capital ships. However, in view of the
anticipated long-term buildup of the fleet, these compromises seemed acceptable.
The last of three Panzerschiffe was launched in June 1934. The next two units were
upgraded to battle cruisers (31,000 tons, thirty-one knots, nine 28 cm guns) in answer to the French battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg.74
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, allowed Germany to
have a surface fleet with a tonnage up to 35 percent of that of the British Empire.
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German naval leaders now believed they had attained their goal of “equal” rights.
The 35 percent ceiling applied not just to total tonnage but to individual categories
of warships. In the case of U-boats, Germany was allowed to achieve 45 percent
at first, later 100 percent, of British submarine strength. In this context, Germany
gave assurances that its navy would adhere to what were known as the “cruiser
rules” regarding submarine warfare conducted against merchant shipping.75
The navy’s planning thus was based wholly on the structure of that of the other
naval powers. Its motto was: What the other navies, with their rich traditions, consider proper, and what Germany now is permitted within the 35 percent ceiling, is
what Germany will build. The navy started to build a so-called normal fleet: fast
capital ships, heavy and light cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, and—for the
first time after seventeen years—submarines. One week after the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement was announced, the navy commissioned its first, small (250-ton)
U-boat—thereby revealing its long-term secret preparatory activity in this area.76
Even if the U-boat had not been improved in basic ways since 1918, it had developed considerably in every direction (e.g., in its improved torpedoes, its minelaying ability, and its capacity to transmit and receive signals both while surfaced
and while submerged). Nevertheless, opinion was widespread in all navies that
the U-boat had lost the eminence it had achieved in World War I as one of the
most effective naval weapons. The British Admiralty was convinced that asdic
(a submarine location device named after its progenitor, the Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee) had reduced the submarine threat almost to extinction. In contrast to this opinion, the small German U-boat staff, centered on
Capt. Karl Dönitz (1891–1980), was convinced that antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
weapons were greatly overrated and had not made decisive progress since 1918.77
From 1928 onward, Admiral Raeder determined the navy’s thinking. In studying Germany’s World War I cruiser campaign, he had come to the conclusion that
during the autumn of 1914 there had been a strategic correlation between the
North Sea campaign and the operations of the cruiser squadrons in the Pacific and
South Atlantic. Raeder realized that all naval theaters of war formed an interconnected whole, so any operation had to be viewed in relation to those in other areas.
Accordingly, he made overseas cruiser warfare and battle-fleet operations in home
waters integral components of a single naval strategy that sought to exploit diversionary effects, thereby exhausting the enemy’s forces and disrupting his supplies.78
Raeder formulated his strategic thinking most clearly in a briefing to Hitler on
February 3, 1937. Analyzing Germany’s Great War experiences, he pointed out the
correlation between strategy and a country’s military-geographical situation. Raeder was aware of the likely “totality” of a future war—that it would be a struggle not
just between forces but of “nation versus nation.” He emphasized the negative consequences for Germany if it were unable to procure continually the raw materials it
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lacked. In so doing, Raeder pointed out the glaring weaknesses in Germany’s war
potential—but was unable to influence Hitler’s policy of confrontation.79
Buildup of the Navy against Britain, 1938–39
A fundamental change in strategic planning by the Kriegsmarine (as the German
navy was known after 1935) commenced in spring 1938. As it became apparent
that the Western powers opposed German expansion, Hitler issued a directive that
all German war preparations should consider not only France and Russia but also
Britain as potential enemies. A second confrontation with Britain now influenced
all further planning for the next naval war. Raeder followed Hitler’s hazardous
course of confrontation willingly, or at least without protest, in contravention
of his strong statement on this matter to Groener in 1929. Raeder assumed—
erroneously—that the navy would have several years of peace to continue its
buildup.
In the summer of 1938, the naval staff produced a strategic study that concluded
that, given a geographical starting position similar to that of 1914, only oceanic
cruiser warfare, employing improved Panzerschiffe and U-boats, held any prospect of success.80 Despite this realization, a planning committee of senior officers
busied itself with the question of what tasks battleships could perform in a cruiser
war in the Atlantic. The result was paradoxical and revealing: “The chief of staff of
the naval staff concluded at the end of the discussion that all participants agreed
that battleships were necessary, but that no consensus regarding their use could be
achieved for the time being.”81
Traditionalists considered the most important arm of naval power to be capital
ships. Focusing on them meant that the concept of sea control pushed the concept
of sea denial into the background. Unlike the big-ship traditionalist Tirpitz, the
naval staff during the 1930s had proposed a sea-denial strategy repeatedly. In contrast, the suggestion to develop a German strategy of sea control constituted a new,
alternative approach to sea and world power in the twentieth century. In September
1938, the commander in chief of the fleet, Adm. Rolf Carls (1885–1945), noted as
follows: “If, in accordance with the will of the Führer, Germany is to achieve a firm
world-power position, it will need, in addition to sufficient colonies, secure sea
routes and access to the high seas. . . . A war against Britain means a war against
the Empire, against France, probably also against Russia and a number of countries
overseas, in other words against one-half or two-thirds of the whole world.”82
Nevertheless, Raeder was more inclined toward a sea-denial strategy via an oceanic cruiser campaign with Panzerschiffe, and he intended to give this strategy priority in the future armament program. However, by November 1938 he had been
unable to gain Hitler’s support for his program. Hitler did not accept the cruiser
warfare strategy, insisting instead that the navy step up the pace of its battleship
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construction so that as soon as possible he would have at his disposal an instrument of power he could employ globally.
The navy had to accept this decisive change. It formulated a new concept, the
so-called Z-Plan, which centered on the construction of six capital ships by 1944.
Additionally, battle cruisers, Panzerschiffe, aircraft carriers, fast light cruisers, and
247 U-boats were to form the backbone of German naval forces for the future Battle
of the Atlantic. On January 27, 1939, when Hitler ordered that the buildup of the
navy was to take precedence over all other tasks, including the rearmament of the
army and the Luftwaffe (air force), he heralded a gigantic buildup of naval forces.
Within a few months, the planning of a series of six new-design, diesel-driven battleships was complete; the construction of two units began in the summer of 1939.
In the meantime, on April 27, 1939, Hitler denounced the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement of 1935.83
The experiences of World War I acted as the starting point for developing the
so-called pack tactics that German U-boats employed against enemy sea routes
during World War II.84 Dönitz recognized that the concentration of merchant shipping in convoys would require a similar concentration of U-boats to counter. And
before the U-boats could attack a convoy, they needed to locate it—in other words,
the problem of reconnaissance would have to be solved. In 1917–18, a number of
U-boats had attacked successfully on the surface, under cover of darkness. During
the evaluation of wartime experiences, former U-boat commanders recommended
adoption and further development of this method of attack. Dönitz also had drawn
attention to the advantages of night attacks in his book Die U-Bootswaffe, published
in 1939. Nonetheless, later in World War II, this type of attack took British ASW
defenses by surprise—they had relied too much on the supposed superiority of
asdic. The escort forces were unable to cope with the German tactic, particularly as
asdic had an effective range of no more than about 1,400 meters, which left it ineffective against U-boats operating on the surface.85
WORLD WAR II
Disillusionment came on September 3, 1939. Totally unexpectedly, Hitler ordered
the navy to launch a naval war against Britain.86 The German navy was in no way
prepared. Raeder’s initial estimate of the situation was very pessimistic, and he resigned himself to the realization that neither the few U-boats nor the surface forces
would have any decisive effect on the outcome of the war: “They can do no more
than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are willing to create the
foundations for later reconstruction.”87
However, the progress of the war soon demanded a new estimate of the situation. Nine months on, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands had been occupied; by June 22, 1940, France had suffered a total
defeat. German naval control extended from Norway to the Pyrenees. Therefore,
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the German naval staff switched to an offensive concept of naval warfare, aimed
solely at destroying Britain’s maritime transport capacity. The Kriegsmarine’s surface forces were insufficient for such a task; to supplement them, the navy concentrated on constructing and employing the means of naval warfare that had proved
its worth during World War I—the U-boat.
The naval staff knew from its experience during the previous war that employment of the U-boat against the enemy’s merchant marine could be successful only
if U-boats were deployed continuously along the enemy’s SLOCs, employing as
many vessels as possible. The navy calculated that the number of U-boats permanently at sea should range from 100 to 150 boats. Taking into consideration time
for maintenance and resupply, this meant the navy needed approximately three
hundred operational boats at its disposal.88 In the quest to achieve this, time was an
important factor:
1. In an economic war waged against a country that depended on supplies by
sea, success could only be achieved in the long run. It was therefore a question
of continuously weakening the enemy’s maritime transport capacity to an extent
that exceeded the rate at which the enemy could construct new merchantmen.
2. From the summer of 1940 onward, it became apparent that the British war
effort increasingly was being supported by the resources of the United States.
This made the naval staff intent on “putting Britain out of action soon, before
the effects of even greater American aid made themselves felt.”89
3. Since it took around two years to construct a U-boat and bring it to operational status, amassing the numbers the navy envisaged so as to achieve the necessary concentration of forces required plans to be made at a very early stage.90
While a numerically increasing U-boat fleet held out the prospect of German
success, the naval staff had to take into account that the enemy, in view of the looming threat, would do everything he could to strengthen his ASW effort.
In October 1939, the naval command presented a U-boat buildup plan that set
a monthly rate of twenty-nine boats. Hitler approved the plan; however, he refused
to sanction priority, since he was at that time more concerned with the demands of
the imminent land campaign against France.91 One year later, in November 1940,
the navy had to realize that U-boat construction was being held up by shortages,
and that the current building rate barely covered the current loss rate. The naval staff foresaw that there would be limits to the Reich’s material resources and
production capacities. In December 1940, it viewed America’s growing support of
Britain as a dangerous development “towards a marked prolongation of the war.”
To the naval staff, this portended a “very negative effect on the overall German war
strategy.”92 This statement expressed the simple, obvious fact that Germany could
not win a prolonged war of attrition against the two Atlantic naval powers.
For this reason, in December 1940, Grand Admiral Raeder requested that Hitler “recognize that the greatest task of the hour is concentration of all our power
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against Britain.” To Raeder, this meant focusing air and naval forces against British
supplies. The admiral was firmly convinced that U-boats were the decisive weapon
to be used against Britain. Although Hitler did not reject Raeder’s view, he referred
to the allegedly new political situation: the necessity “to eliminate at all cost the last
enemy remaining [i.e., Soviet Russia] on the continent, before he can collaborate
with Britain. . . . After that, everything can be concentrated on the needs of the
Air Force and the Navy.”93 In Hitler’s eyes, Britain was not the enemy on which
all weapons had to be concentrated, but a potential partner who might be made
to “see reason” if an appropriate amount of military pressure were applied. Hitler
also knew that a forced economic war could not lead to any marked success in one
year. Furthermore, this kind of effort could increase the danger of the United States
entering the war, something he sought to avoid at that point.94
In July 1941, after the first successes in the war against Russia, the naval staff
tried to convince both the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) Command and Hitler of
the immediate strategic necessity to concentrate on fighting the Anglo-Saxon naval
powers. Analyzing the threat to which Germany was exposed, the naval staff portrayed the dilemma of a European continental state that lacked the vital elements of
a naval power but was forced to fight against the greatest naval powers: “While in
World War I we had the second strongest battle fleet in the world but no appropriate operational base, we now dispose of a strategically favorable operational base,
however, we do not have the required battle fleet to operate within the Atlantic.”95
The naval staff predicted that the two Allied naval powers would continue to
fight, even if the Soviet Union collapsed, so they could reach their “final goal”:
destroying Germany on the continent. The naval staff came to the conclusion that
“the enemies’ prospect for the battle in the Atlantic for the year 1942 must be assessed as favorable.” For this reason, the naval staff advocated that Germany bring
about a decision in the Atlantic by taking advantage of both political assets (the
cooperation of Vichy-France and Japan) and military assets (the concentrated employment of all available forces, in particular the U-boats and air forces).96
From 1940 onward, Germany possessed a good geographical position for naval
warfare in the Atlantic, but this basis could not be exploited fully, owing to insufficient weaponry. The U-boat provided an effective weapon in the fight against
enemy shipping up to 1942, but thereafter wider war demands, especially the critical situations in the Mediterranean and on the eastern front, forced the naval command to employ its last remaining offensive capability like an “operational fire
brigade.”97 This led to enormous attrition, which was counterproductive to the strategic concept of mass concentration in the Atlantic. As the Allies developed better
ASW weapons, the concept of a “U-boat war” failed in 1943 because the submarine
had lost its ability to escape from enemy surveillance.
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In fact, the concept of attrition warfare began to fail by the fall of 1942 in the
face of the mobilization of Allied resources and industrial capacities, especially those of the United States. The German naval staff analysis at that time of the
accelerating buildup of Allied maritime transport capacity already revealed that
the U-boats could not increase the monthly rate of sinkings to a level necessary
to win the “tonnage race.” The naval staff delivered a pessimistic prognosis: “If,
. . . considering the enemy’s rising production output, Germany wishes to diminish
the enemy’s tonnage from the end of 1942 onwards to the same extent as is currently
being achieved, ship sinkings per month will have to be increased to approximately
1,300,000 GRT. Given the current situation, it is doubtful whether such a high rate
of ship sinkings will be feasible for a sustained period of time.”98 Recalling the historical argument that “no war in history . . . has yet been won by the use of one
method of warfare,” the naval staff came around to an understanding that reflected
actual conditions.99 By the end of 1942, German U-boats, as a realistic threat, had
succumbed to the immense industrial capacity of the United States.
From 1943 onward, the navy had an officer at the helm, Grand Admiral Dönitz,
who both was a charismatic leader and had close links to Hitler and Nazi ideology.
Not until after Hitler’s death did he change “from the almost-blind tool of a criminal to the responsible soldier of the traditional Prussian school.”100 At that point he
did everything in his power to end the already-lost war in a proper fashion and, at
the same time, to evacuate as many people as possible across the Baltic to the West.
The latter effort—the navy’s last wartime act—brought the service much positive
postwar public recognition.101
Over the course of the twentieth century, Germany twice tried to force a strategic decision, in direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon naval powers, by cutting
the Atlantic shipping routes. Both attempts ended in failure. The second defeat
brought with it the end of the German Reich and the dissolution of all German
armed forces.
BUILDING A NEW NAVY AFTER 1955
The Western orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) led to close
integration of the new German armed forces into the Atlantic Alliance.102 Ten years
after the surrender of Germany’s World War II forces, a new German naval force
came into existence. The allied forces—especially the U.S. Navy, including its CNO,
Adm. Arleigh Burke (1901–96)—supported its creation. During the first years of
the buildup, a close cooperation and friendship developed between Admiral Burke
and Vice Adm. Friedrich Ruge (1894–1985), the first head of the Federal German
Navy (FGN).103
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Burke created a basis of confidence with his firm conviction that allied forces
could fulfill their common tasks only if their cooperation were based on openness
and mutual trust. Vice Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this basis of confidence, which today is accepted as a matter of course.
This meant for the FGN, the smallest of the armed services within the FRG
armed forces, that, for the first time in its history, the naval service was obliged
merely to perform that function “which a German Navy can actually perform,” in
close cooperation with the great maritime powers.104
At the same time the FRG joined NATO in May 1955, the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) was integrated into the Warsaw Pact. The formation of light naval
forces ensued, out of the Volkspolizei See (i.e., the national sea police force of the
GDR) that had been in existence since 1950. In 1960, the GDR’s newly established
forces were termed Volksmarine (People’s Navy), in commemoration of the 1918
revolutionary tradition. This navy, which was strictly integrated within the ideological leadership claimed by the Communist Party, demonstrated little continuity
with former German naval forces, whether in formation, structure, or mandate.
Within the Warsaw Pact it evolved into an offensive naval force for use in confined
and littoral waters.
The two German naval forces exhibited great disparity until 1990. Each navy
regarded the other as a potential military adversary in the context of the system of
alliances. However, both were spared the necessity to prove their combat strength.
With the reunification of the German republics in the fall of 1990, parts of each
were incorporated into the German navy.105
Today, the German navy has not only a lively interest in its history but a special
relationship to it. A clear link can be seen between the historical self-understanding
of its officers and the history of their service. In the past, this link often served only
as an attempt to legitimize and secure the service’s position. The navy, which came
into being in the mid-nineteenth century, often had to fight for recognition and
even for its existence during a relatively short history. However, when historical
interest is limited only to the navy and naval warfare, there is a danger that too little
attention will be paid to the overlapping political correlations.
Nowadays the situation is different. Germany is one of the leading export nations
in the world, and therefore extremely dependent on trade and the unhampered
use of the high seas. This situation requires an understanding and an acceptance
of the maritime domain as a vital Achilles’ heel for the prosperity of the German
economy and society. This situation underlines the necessity for a well-balanced
navy that is able to conduct demonstrations and to protect German maritime interests, in cooperation with alliances and partners. The situation for the German
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navy is much more comfortable at present than in previous eras, reinforcing its selfconfidence; but a wider understanding of its roles is needed, now more than ever.
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IV
History, Truth Decay, and
the Naval Profession
GEOFFREY TILL

W

hy in this age of constant technological, economic, social, and political
change should navies actively concern themselves with the naval past?
Herein I will try to answer this question, one often asked by skeptics
anxious to insert into the developing courses of professional military education
(PME) material that seems so much more relevant to the contemporary problems
they face. The result easily can lead to efforts to cut history out of the syllabus
or, more insidiously, to reduce it to the level where it becomes little more than a
means of socializing new entrants and developing team spirit, necessary and laudable though those aims might be. After all, it has been said, with some justice, that
a navy that does not know its history has no soul.1
I will start by reviewing some of the basic problems that today’s navies face.
Then I will consider the contribution that naval history might make to dealing with
those problems, first as a quarry of processed experience and second as an intellectual exercise. Finally, I will seek to show the particular value of history in developing naval professionalism in a challenging social media age. By way of conclusion, I
will look at some of the responsibilities that all this lays on historians.
CONTEXT: SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS FOR NAVIES
2
The basic point is that navies need to understand their function. This isn’t easy,
these days. The potential tasks of navies have expanded, have grown more complex,
and increasingly are seen as relatively more important, as the burgeoning navies
of the Asia-Pacific region so amply demonstrate. For the navies of the twenty-first
century, it is no longer enough to understand the war-fighting and deterrent warprevention roles, analyzed by the likes of Mahan and Corbett at the beginning of
the last century, as they are affected by the international, technological, and social
realities of this one. That is difficult enough.
Now we have to add a whole series of nontraditional, “postmodern” tasks associated with Maritime Security (with capital letters). These include the challenges
presented by drug runners, trafficking in illegal migrants, international terrorism,
humanitarian action, disaster relief, environmental protection, search and rescue,
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capacity building, security sector reform, and so on. In many cases, early and effective engagement in these so-called Phase 0 activities will head off the need to
exercise traditional war-fighting skills later on.3 But preparing for what the British
military currently calls contingency is an inherently complicated business.4
One problem in the pursuit of guidance for making unavoidably difficult decisions about relative operational priorities is that of having to “see through a glass
darkly.” It is uniformly and intrinsically difficult for foreign ministries, treasuries, or defense and naval staffs to predict the future or to gauge its requirements.
This difficulty is demonstrated by the problems that all navies face these days in
getting their kit because the lead times normally required to produce sophisticated naval weapons, sensors, and platforms and their probable service lives are
likely to be very long. A great many of the ships of the fleets of the 2030s are already at sea or at an advanced stage of design.5 This, together with rising costs
and reduced budgets, makes the acquisition of naval matériel increasingly difficult.
One set of victims of the procurement process (taking a leaf out of Jane Austen’s
book) have remarked recently, “It is a truth universally acknowledged that defence equipment acquisition is one of the most challenging of human activities . . .
a uniquely demanding bureaucratic morass littered with military, technological,
economic, and political pitfalls.”6
Future-oriented procurement strategies tend to suffer badly from the unpredictability of the future economic, budgetary, and strategic environments. All too
frequently, this development risk produces cycles of boom and bust that make sustained planning over, say, a thirty-year period almost impossible for manufacturers
and their customers. Typically, this will result in constant delays, cost increases,
and iterative tinkering with original specifications—and eventually in the failure or
chronic delay of the program in ways that mean that the navy tends to acquire new
matériel in a piecemeal, opportunistic way rather than as part of an overall strategic plan. This manner of acquisition may undermine a navy’s capacity to perform
its present roles, not to mention its future ones. No navy has shown itself immune
to such pressures and constraints; all navies need to be encouraged to think about
how best to get around, if not to overcome, such difficulties.
Another problem is that, to some extent at least, the requirements of these possible contingency tasks conflict with those of the more familiar war-fighting ones.
The funds expended on a carrier, for example, could generate any number of capable offshore patrol vessels. Again, the more sailors train for things such as the
detection and apprehension of drug runners, the less they can train for antisubmarine operations. Given that resources, both human and material, are finite, choices
have to be made.
Paradoxically, this is partly an unexpected product of success. Because of the
fundamental flexibility of sea power, navies can deliver everything from bombs to
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babies, so they often are called on to do more or less everything at sea and quite
often on land as well. Since the world’s navies thus have shown themselves to be of
such utility across the full spectrum of possible maritime operations, their success
has increased the painful matter of operational and strategic choice dramatically in
the setting of priorities for which they prepare. This is not an entirely new problem
for them, of course, since navies always have had to take on functions other than
those of simply obliterating one another, but there is a strong argument for saying
that their resulting dilemmas of choice are much greater now than they ever have
been before.
Worse still, all these possible roles and requirements are in a state of constant
change. A force at sea, even one already engaged in prosecuting its dedicated mission, can find itself also having to confront and respond to a whole host of different high- and low-intensity challenges across the spectrum, especially when, as
they usually do, events combine to confound initial expectations about the nature
and almost certainly the length of the original mission. As is so often said in such
dynamic situations, it is unwise to assume your plan’s survival once contact with
the problem is made. Thus when a number of Western powers thought they were
intervening in the civil war in Libya in 2011 merely to avert a humanitarian crisis
in Misrātah and elsewhere, the situation morphed into something much more demanding, which has yet to be resolved.
Mahan and Corbett do not seem to have much guidance to offer on such matters, because the focus of their thought was largely on higher-intensity operations,
although they were perfectly well aware of the requirement for, and the potential
challenge of, lower-intensity ones. They assumed that once a navy’s major high-end
tasks were dealt with satisfactorily, the rest could look after itself. But now the “rest”
quite often has become the major focus of concern.
This is because today’s situation has become more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA, for short!), partly because some of today’s leading states want it to be, and so pursue “a multidimensional and multidisciplinary
strategy that consciously blurs the classical distinctions between warriors and
non-combatants, front and rear, peace and war, state and proxies, and fact and
fiction; and which employs a variety of tools—military technology and operations, information and cyber, economic pressure, ethnic bridgeheads and
sensitivities—in order to manipulate both rival societies and [the states’] own.”7
Although such techniques are certainly not new, the extra attention they warrant
today creates an ambiguous, confusing, and, frankly, potentially demoralizing situation. But if understood, they provide opportunities as well as challenges.
So how can the study of past events in naval history, as part of a well-rounded
package of PME, possibly help navies prepare for the issues they will face? We
will look at this from two different angles: naval history as a quarry of potentially
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relevant data and—arguably more important, especially these days—naval history
as an intellectual process.
THE POWER OF EXAMPLE FROM THE PROCESSED PAST
History is processed experience. Naval history is a source of innumerable examples
of the way things have been done in the past. For all the historians’ reluctance to
think of the lessons of history, or even their norms, the past is a source of previous
experience that might well help present practitioners in comparable but not identical situations to understand their problems better and to think through what they
should do to solve them.8 Although, as frequently has been said, history does not
repeat itself—it rhymes.9 As Michael Howard reminded us back in 1962, there are
patterns: “Wars still resemble each other more than they resemble any other human
activity.”10 Naval professionals, arguably, should know those patterns, but in their
search for what the Russians call the “norms” of military experience, or what they
generally should expect, it is vital that they also should spot the differences as well
as the similarities between their situation and perhaps only superficially similar
ones in the processed past.
Looking at something such as the sinking of the Royal Navy’s Prince of Wales
and Repulse off Malaya by Japanese aircraft in December 1941, for example, teaches
us all sorts of things about the need for interservice cooperation, sustainable balances between resources and commitments, not underestimating your adversary,
and so on. For all its dangers, not least the evident danger of mythmaking, there is
much to be said for the simple notion of seeing the past as providing previous examples of the problems of the present and future.11 Such historical case studies are
also ideal means for advancing understanding by way of counterfactual questions:
What would have happened, for example, if the British in the autumn of 1941 had
sent hundreds of tanks and aircraft to Singapore instead of to Russia? Why didn’t
they?12
The point also can be exemplified by reverting to the problems of naval procurement already discussed. While the past is indeed another country, today’s planners in the defense procurement field are facing problems and issues that are not
that dissimilar from those faced by their predecessors. Those responsible for the
design and procurement of today’s Queen Elizabeth–class aircraft carriers in the
United Kingdom hardly can fail to have been aware of the demoralizing experience
of their predecessors in the 1960s. This second time around, at the broadest level,
the needs to be sufficiently clear about the projected roles of the ship, to keep unavoidable interservice competition down to manageable limits, and not to get too
far away from what would seem to be financially viable in the circumstances of the
time all seem to have been hoisted in.13 The difficulty of their task, though, clearly
provides an incentive for growing the smart customer, and it is hard to avoid the
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conclusion that study of the way in which such difficulties were handled in the past
will provide at least some guidance for the present and the future.
Another area in which history as processed experience—a source of
example—can be argued to have something to offer is in leadership. Leadership,
of course, varies enormously in its character and its function. On the face of it, the
kind of leadership required to command in battle is not necessarily the same as that
required to lead a design team in a submarine-acquisition project or to run a shore
establishment. But is that true? Again, looking at past examples of these kinds of
leadership at the very least should encourage discussion and increase understanding of this otherwise very slippery concept.14 In short, looking at previous examples
of a campaign, problem, or issue enables people at least to ask the right questions
and so to develop a broader understanding. It cannot be said too often that the dissimilarities between the past and present cases are likely to be at least as important
as the similarities in this process.
One of the reasons for this is the crucial role of the broader context in determining outcomes. For this reason, Michael Howard emphasizes the importance of
studying history in context as well as in width and depth.15 Naval history can be a
powerful way of reminding professionals of the importance of context, so it should
be designed to encourage them to take a wider view of the impact of the international, technological, social, and financial backgrounds to their operations. “Was
the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 lost on the beaches of the peninsula or around the
conference table in London?” is the sort of question that, as historians, we should
be getting students to think about if they are to understand not only the purpose,
planning, and conduct of operations but the management of defense more widely.
Getting people to look above the parapet and not to be focused exclusively on the
all-too-demanding problems of their part of the ship (to meld a few analogies, in
the spirit of jointness) is, or should be, an essential objective of PME.
As an aside, it is also hard to think of an approach better designed to encourage reflection about the three levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic—
and the manner in which they interact. Encouraging students to track the consequences of the strategic decision-making process in London all the way down to
the deficiencies in preparation on the landing beaches of the Gallipoli Peninsula
(such as the lack of sufficient medical facilities, water supply, and so forth) and then
to follow the tactical consequences back up through the hierarchy of decision to
those ultimately responsible for making strategic-level decisions hardly can fail to
help develop a more rounded understanding of military operations.
The list of areas like this in which naval history as processed experience can
provide helpful examples for constructive reflection by today’s warriors of course
could go on almost indefinitely, but there’s also another aspect to history as a quarry
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of illustrative, if not explanatory, material to be noted. That aspect is to consider the
past as prologue to the present, and maybe to the future, too.
History helps us to understand the context and explains how we have arrived at
where we are today, and therefore it also helps us to understand the present rather
better, and from that to design sustainable policies for the future.16 Take, for example, the increasingly contentious issue of the historic freedom of navigation for
warships. Naval activity is, and always has been, framed by contemporary interpretations of the law, and vice versa; understanding the background to those changing
interpretations is an essential part of the professional sailor’s intellectual kit bag.
Or at least it should be, if sailors are to hold their own in the expressions of differences of opinion at sea and in the defining of operational priorities. Arguably, the
ability to comprehend, to deploy, and to make use of the law of the sea has become
an ever-more-crucial component of twenty-first-century sea power. At all levels of
command, understanding its development and its importance confers advantage.
At the moment, some aspects of this remain matters of contention as the U.S.
Navy and other Western navies try to defend the basic notion of freedom of navigation against what they see as a continentalist tide that is seeking, in effect, to territorialize the sea by insidiously claiming more and more jurisdiction over what once
was regarded uniformly as the high seas. This has given rise to a host of regrettable
incidents. All concerned in the matter of freedom of navigation, most particularly
of warships, really need to understand the issues—what’s at stake, in other words—
and how this situation has arisen.
Knowing what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea says, for
example, about the rights of warships in others’ exclusive economic zones is not
enough, because the wording of the convention (being a political bargain) has
enough ambiguity in it to allow (just about, and at a stretch) different interpretations—and there are strong operational and emotional reasons why some countries
seek to exploit, or even ignore, vague or unhelpful provisions of the pact altogether.
International law, after all, is nothing more than a set of political agreements that
apply to a certain time and place, and is in any case susceptible to change through
subsequent state practice. As one of its leading experts has remarked, “The history
of the law of the sea has been dominated by a central and persistent theme—the
competition between the exercise of governmental authority over the sea and the
idea of the freedom of the seas. The tension between these has waxed and waned
through the centuries, and has reflected the political, strategic, and economic circumstances of each particular age.”17
For this reason, simply knowing and enforcing the law are not enough. What
navies ought to be doing as well is not just pontificating about what they think the
law says on freedom of navigation for warships but explaining why upholding it is
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a good thing for everyone. This task cannot be left to lawyers alone. Only naval history can show us exactly why this apparently arcane principle is important enough
to risk lives for, and all concerned need to know it, not least those whose lives might
in the present or future be in question because of it.
The same kind of developmental approach can be applied, of course, to all other
aspects of sea power, in which knowing how we got to where we are provides probable guidance to where we should go next; although sadly, but perhaps inevitably,
lessons identified are not necessarily learned. This approach also has been lampooned by skeptics who liken it to trying to drive down a twisting country road
while peering through the back window of the car. This overstates the point. The
truth is that when driving, while we look through the front windscreen most of the
time, it’s good to keep an occasional eye on the rearview mirror as well.
Christopher Andrew, the historian of the British Security Service, has drawn
attention to the lamentable consequences of such people not knowing their own
history and identifies what he calls a “historical attention-span deficit disorder”
(HASDD, for short) as the root cause of the problem. Hal Brands and William
Inboden recently have done the same for those who would practice statecraft, arguing the unwisdom of neglecting “a fount of information and insight for leaders
grappling with the challenges of statecraft in a messy world.” But this argument
should not be overdone either, for all but the most obsessive of historians would
admit that history isn’t the only thing that matters.18
NAVAL HISTORY AS AN INTELLECTUAL EXERCISE
The second angle on the value of naval history for PME is not as a quarry of data,
material, and example, but more as an intellectual discipline that encourages the
development of thinking and of analytical, and very possibly behavioral, skills that
should help make naval professionals smarter. As a former commandant at the U.K.
Joint Service Command and Staff College (JSCSC) used to say, the modern airman,
soldier, and sailor have to respond to perhaps unprecedented levels of strategic ambiguity. They have to improvise creatively, as jazz musicians do around a central
theme, responding dynamically to changes set by others and to the effects of contingency, chance, and general chaos. No more can they fall back on the laboriously
choreographed musical scores set by the kind of constantly rehearsed operational
plans that characterized, for example, the Cold War.19
Instead they have to be prepared for surprise; as Mike Tyson once graphically
remarked, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”20 Hence the
need for what is described gruesomely as the end state of a student at the JSCSC:
“to have developed a mind that is flexible and able to analyse and conceptualise in
a military context in order to make timely and logical decisions in all types of subsequent appointments.”21
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To cope with a complex and often bewildering future in which you easily can get
punched in the mouth by unexpected events, those students will need the capacity
to analyze incomplete and ambiguous data. They need to be able to think through
problems and their consequences, and, most importantly, to keep thinking them
through, long after their staff course, or indeed their latest operation, has ended.
They need to be independent learners. Some at least of what is taught in a one-year
staff course certainly will have a limited shelf life, because the world moves on. Accordingly, students have to be encouraged to develop the independent interest and
the habits of thought and of continuing inquiry that animate the best historians.
This helps produce that very necessary characteristic that some would call insight.22
This can, and should, include as a “golden thread” a continuing interest in the naval
past and its developing relationship with the naval present and the naval future.
Charles Darwin indeed reminds us that it was not necessarily the strongest but
the most adaptable that won the evolutionary race. Naval history helps develop
an openness of mind to uncomfortable ideas that confound and upset one’s own
emerging conclusions. This really amounts to an early acceptance of the notion
that there is no final and complete answer to anything. To paraphrase Napoléon,
we have to tie knots and carry on, always progressing hopefully to what some have
called a higher level of ignorance.23
In this, naval history can help, or maybe it should help, elevate thinking from
the empirical to the conceptual—from the concerns of the tactical, technological
nitty-gritty of yesterday’s or today’s battle to that wider, shaping context that links
the levels of war and conflict. All the same, both the empirical and the conceptual
are necessary parts of the mix. We should not, however, allow the perpetual fascination with the drums and smoke of battle to obscure the more-abstract realities
that in many cases determine outcomes. Naval history, in short, can and should
help us understand the critical business of strategy and policy making.24
Using history in this way is a much more widely practiced activity than is often realized. By the time strategists and policy makers have reached such elevated
positions, they have engaged with history, absorbing views about the relevance of
the past, even if only through a process of osmosis. Either consciously or unconsciously, they use history as a guide for how to think about future policy in a whole
variety of ways.25 The design teams developing the Royal Navy’s Type 26 global
combat ship or those responsible for shaping a navy’s training programs cannot insulate themselves from the past, however hard they may try. They adapt and adopt
its conceptual consequences as they both reflect and help create strategic thinking,
in a continuous iterative cycle of reflection and action. It is quite likely that in many
cases they do not realize they are doing it! Internet bloggers and the young naval
enthusiasts who come together to create online think tanks such as the Center for
International Maritime Security, on the other hand, do so quite consciously, aiming
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to study the past as a guide to the future, and their influence undoubtedly will seep
out in all directions. History, in short, is unavoidable, and it shapes not just conclusions but also approaches and ways of thinking. The real question is not whether to
admit its relevance to today’s problems but how to make the best use of it.
For all that, unfortunately, a sizable constituency of thought in the United Kingdom felt bound to react to what they considered to be Britain’s frankly embarrassing Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010 with the fear that
the country was no longer capable of “doing” strategy, or even thinking about it
constructively—an impression apparently confirmed, in their minds at least, by the
experience of the later stage of the second Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This concern
was triggered initially by the Royal United Services Institute address of December
2009 by the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup,
in which he claimed that Britain had lost the habit of making strategy.
But one thing that’s struck me in my present role, and that I think requires urgent action
over the next year, is the degree to which we seem to have lost an institutionalised capacity
for, and culture of, strategic thought. I’m not saying that we don’t have people who can think
strategically, or that we haven’t evolved a proper strategic basis for our actions. But we’ve
seized on ability where we’ve found it, and as a result our formulation of strategy has been
much harder than should have been the case. We’ve been hunter/gatherers of strategic talent,
rather than nurturers and husbandmen.26

It was followed up through a series of inquiries by the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee and highly critical articles from a large number of academics. Their concerns were reinforced by the uncertain consequences of
Britain’s engagement in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The suggestion was that the
United Kingdom had not thought through what its involvement in these wars was
supposed to achieve, nor the requirements or likely consequences of this involvement, largely because it had lost the habit of consulting the rearview mirror and
developing the agnostic and questioning ways of thought that develop from that.
Did anyone ask for evidence that Britain’s intervention in the intense factionalism
of Afghanistan would be any more successful this time than it had been the first,
second, and third times that Britain had tried it?27
While the urgency of the need to cut government expenditure and to require the
Ministry of Defence to start filling in the “black hole” in its finances perhaps offers
some excuse for the failings of the SDSR, this is less true of Britain’s operational failings. These are hard to explain except in terms of the speed of events to which the
United Kingdom felt it must respond (allowing insufficient time for consultation
and strategic reflection) and, perhaps, the lack of defense experience among the
political class. Nor is the quality of the advice that the military offers to ministers
exempt from academic and insider criticism.28
Nor, sadly, is this inability to do strategy all that uncommon. A good case can
be made that it applied to the Germans and especially the Japanese in the Second
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World War; they managed to combine tactical and operational brilliance with a
strategic insouciance in a manner that now appears quite breathtaking. The point is
that failing to take full advantage of what the historical approach has to offer means
missing a chance to reduce the prospects of strategic failure.
But once again, how, more exactly, can history help? Such help probably lies
much less in the delivery of the facts, or answers, and prescriptions for the future
than in identifying the questions about strategy that those conducting it, or those
trying to understand it, should ask. A brilliant recent review of four very good
books about the causes of the First World War (a subject one might think conclusively studied for a century now) found that “they [did] not even come close to
agreeing . . . [and that] historical consensus on the causes of the First World War
appears no closer than it was 50 or 75 years ago, nor does it appear a shared view
will ever be achieved. . . . This means we must be both cautious and humble when
generalizing about war and peace and making policy recommendations based on
our understanding of the conflict.”29 Much the same, if on a less elevated plane, still
could be said about interpretations of the course and consequence of the Battle
of Jutland and a host of other such familiar naval subjects. The Dutch historian
Pieter Geyl made the essential point that “history is argument without end.”30 But
this is not an apology. In the training it provides for the kind of intellectual dialectic of argument and counterargument that deepens understanding, history makes
a major contribution to our capacity to analyze.
Lawrence Freedman, in his recent magisterial book on strategy, makes a similar point.31 The intrinsic diversity and ambiguity of our subject—the conduct of
military operations, not least at sea—mean that it is very easy to get things fundamentally wrong, but it is sadly hard to get them right, and harder still to achieve an
overall consensus on what is right and what is wrong. Analyzing past examples to
see whether we can work out why some things went well and some did not at least
should identify the questions that we, or anyone else trying to do strategy or to
make policy in the naval realm, should be asking. In this, the process of naval history—the asking of questions, the analysis of data, and the testing of hypotheses—
is more important than the product, the answers. Making the journey, in other
words, can be more useful than arriving at the destination. This is what Dwight D.
Eisenhower meant when he famously observed regarding preparing for battle, “I
have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”32
TRUTH DECAY
There is now—in the age of all-pervasive social media—one final justification for
naval people to have more than a passing familiarity with the disciplines of naval
history. That is the contemporary phenomenon of what some have called truth
decay.33 By this they mean the impact that easy accessibility to and the potentially
overwhelming power of social media is having on people’s trust in authority and
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in traditional forms of expertise. Imperfectly controlled, this platform empowers
cranks, bigots, and those who willfully would deceive by according them the same
apparent status as experts. “Don’t you see,” asks one of the characters in George
Orwell’s novel 1984, “that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of
thought?”34 It is increasingly difficult for people, deluged with showers of contradictory information, deliberate misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories, to know what to believe, which encourages them to fall back on that very
human trait of believing what they want to believe and forming up into dissonant
tribes, unable to relate to, or even understand, the others.
Collectively, this threatens the social order. Some would go further: “We are
facing nothing less than a crisis in our democracy based on the systematic manipulation of data to support the relentless targeting of citizens, without their
consent, by campaigns of disinformation and messages of hate.”35 In the words
of the recently released European Union code on dealing with disinformation, “open and democratic societies depend on public debates that allow wellinformed citizens to express their will through free and fair political processes.”36
As citizens, naval personnel and navies in general are as vulnerable to this as any
other social group—perhaps more so given their generally very high level of computer literacy and the stringent time demands of their profession. As ordinary citizens, they too have an interest in the general well-being of the society in which they
live and that they try to protect against more-traditional forms of threat. Moreover,
whether they like it or not, they are living in a world of competing narratives than
can often be state directed.37
Illustrating the point, in 2009 the Kremlin established the “Commission to Prevent the Falsification of History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests” to counter
Baltic and central European narratives about Soviet occupation and wartime collaboration.38 For its part, Singapore has established a “Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods,” thinking it is important to support social cohesion by
cultivating an informed public and encouraging a culture of fact-checking.39 Staying afloat in this whirlpool of conflicting currents requires a continued capacity for
independent judgment. Navy people (whose basic job is to defend the states and
the societies that pay for those navies) also may be thought to have an even greater
incentive than ordinary citizens to be at least aware of, and ideally able to help to
defeat, these insidious challenges to domestic stability.
Moreover, navies themselves are vulnerable to such campaigns of targeted disinformation. Their missions and activities can be traduced by adversaries, with deleterious impacts on public esteem and their operational effect.40 More sinister and
dangerous still, sailors—often living a tight shipboard life, even ashore—always
have proved vulnerable to the effects of uninformed gossip. In these continuing
circumstances it is easy to imagine the possibilities of greater access to social media
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morphing into a kind of mega-scuttlebutt, with possibly disastrous consequences
for a navy’s cohesiveness and morale. For the same reason, this could be a significant target of opportunity for imaginative adversaries, both foreign and domestic.
Thus, it does not seem unreasonable for navies to regard this possibility as a new
battleground for them to take seriously.
Once again, how might a familiarity with naval history, both as processed experience and as an intellectual discipline, offer some modest help against these potentially ominous developments? It will be modest, because in an age when most
people get their news from Facebook and Twitter feeds, and in which traditional
journalism may well be in terminal decline, this is a fundamental problem way
beyond easy solutions.41 But nonetheless, for naval personnel, history may help a
little. First, perhaps history can show that this is an old, almost-familiar problem,
now reappearing in a new and potentially more virulent form. This could be done,
for example, by looking at the role of misinformation in naval mutinies and other
such disasters, as a way of alerting naval personnel to the dangers they confront,
and maybe to ways of dealing with them—or even employing them against their
adversaries.42
More importantly, perhaps, the discipline of history itself encourages openmindedness, the careful weighing of evidence, and the asking of questions, and it
provides other such intellectual defenses when confronted with purported information and what very well could prove to be fake news. Any kind of serious study
could serve this function, of course, but naval history is more accessible and, for
other reasons discussed earlier, is especially relevant to the naval profession.
While much of what has been said may be true for all disciplines and subject areas
and for all types of history, for national leaders, strategic decision makers, and operational commanders, the obvious salience of specifically naval history for sailors,
given the undeniable continuities of operations at sea over the centuries, means
naval history is particularly useful in this regard. Moreover, for sailors at all levels,
naval history, whether conscious and constructed or not, is unavoidable. Whatever
historians might think of it, naval students, strategists, and policy makers will go on
using what they at least think is history as a guide to future behavior.
This being the case, it lays considerable responsibility on naval historians. First,
as John Hattendorf has reminded us, historians need to recognize that their subject
does not end in 1945 or with the closing of the Cold War (assuming that conflict
has even ended!).43 History is yesterday as well. This poses unavoidable evidential
problems. Analysis, therefore, has to be preceded by the availability of primary material. In any case, much of what in the past would have produced survivable paper
copies (or much less survivable photostats) now appears only as transitory e-mails,
exchanges in chat rooms, and so on. Since “recovering the unrecorded past” is at
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least as important as it was, tomorrow’s historians and their naval students will
need their twenty-first-century skills as well as the more traditional ones employed
by yesterday’s historians.44
Second, historians need to encourage their navies to be receptive to the past, to
preserve and process the records (or what these days passes for records) of what
they have done to build a bank of experience for the future. They need to nurture
those veterans who actually had that experience and are willing to talk about it, if
they only had the encouragement to do so. The results of this testimony need to
be preserved in accessible form and made available for appropriate use. Today’s
practitioners need to know that something similar to their current preoccupations
probably has happened before.45
Third, historians need to encourage thinking about things in the round: paying
due regard to context and avoiding narrow fixations on monocausal explanations.
They need to understand the technological and logistical realities of what it is actually like to be at sea—hence the particular value of ex-sailors who are also historians. They also need to avoid unconscious hindsight and to sympathize with their
subjects, who clearly could not enjoy its advantages.
Fourth, they need to ensure that what they deliver is accessible, interesting, and
even enjoyable. My experience at a variety of service educational establishments is
that naval students usually do rather enjoy doing naval history—or at least freely
concede that they found that engaging in a modicum of historical research was
worthwhile. In this, historians are likely to be pushing on an open door; at the very
least, they should do everything possible to stop it from shutting. One way of doing
this is to ask the speculative “What if?” counterfactual questions referred to earlier.
The process of isolating and altering one variable in the historic equation invites
speculation about the difference it could have made to some past and completed
event, and often will stimulate both insight into and enthusiasm for the subject.
Finally, they should make their subject policy relevant, wherever possible. For
some this will be difficult. Some historians, knowing how their findings can be
distorted to suit a different time, seek—for the best of professional reasons—to
insulate their discipline from the contaminating fingers of strategists and policy
makers and would have nothing to do with their world. However understandable,
this purist approach is unwise for all but a few keepers of the sacred flame.
The pressure of other urgent PME requirements means the default position of
those responsible for its implementation is all too likely to reduce the teaching of
history as much as possible. The long and generally depressing story of the Royal
Navy’s neglect or misuse, or both, of its own really rather spectacular history (and
its sometimes dire operational consequences) unfortunately illustrates the point.46
Historians need to counter this modernist tendency to the extent they can.
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In sum, history, similar to the poor and taxes, is always with us, whether we like
it or know it or not. We cannot avoid it. This being so, it is plainly the duty of naval
historians to do their best to ensure that what they deliver is valid as both processed
experience and an intellectual discipline. They owe this to the future as much as to
the past.
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